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Abstract 
In Australia and New Zealand, residential buildings have the highest number of fire fatalities 
each year, compared to any other occupancy type. The majority of these fatalities occur in 
single family dwellings, but a proportion of these fatalities occur in apartment buildings. 
Apartment building fires also have the potential to be high fatality fires, due to greater 
occupant numbers and more complex egress paths. 
With the movement away from prescriptive building codes, building fire safety design can 
become more efficient and effective. This should ultimately result in equivalent or better fire 
safety for occupants, and economical savings with respect to the building codes. 
The objective of this research report is to discuss the primary issues concerning apartment 
buildings and to provide a guidance matrix for the fire safety design of apartment buildings, 
that comprehensively integrates all aspects of fire safety. The fire safety design matrix is 
presented as a three by two matrix, which recommends minimum fire safety measures based 
on building height, sprinkler protection and the building emergency plan. The selection of fire 
safety measures is based on providing multiple levels of protection for the occupants, and 
addressing the primary characteristics of different apartment buildings. 
v 
Table of Contents 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Design Objectives ......................................................................................................... 3 
2 APARTMENT BUILDINGS ••••••••••••••.••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
2.1 Design Issues ................................................................................................................. 4 
3 RESIDENTIAL FIRE STATISTICS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 7 
3.1 New Zealand ................................................................................................................. 7 
3.2 Australia ........................................................................................................................ 8 
3.3 United States ................................................................................................................. 9 
3.4 Discussion .................................................................................................................... 10 
4 ARE CURRENT FIRE SAFETY MEASURES IN APARTMENT BUILDINGS ADEQUATE? •••••• 12 
4.1 Fatalities ...................................................................................................................... 12 
4.2 Injuries ........................................................................................................................ 13 
4.3 Discussion .................................................................................................................... 14 
5 OCCUPANT CHARACTERISTICS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 16 
5.1 Occupant Location ..................................................................................................... 17 
5.1.1 Occupants in the apartment of fire origin .................................................................................... 17 
5.1.2 Occupants on the floor of fire origin ............................................................................................ 18 
5.1.3 Occupants remote ji·om the floor of fire origin ............................................................................ 18 
6 FIRE SAFErfY MEASURES .................................................................................................. 20 
6.1 Detection ..................................................................................................................... 20 
6.2 Alarm System ............................................................................................................. 22 
6.3 Sprinlder Protection .................................................................................................. 24 
6.4 Smoke Control ............................................................................................................ 26 
7 FIRE BRIGADE INTERVENTION •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 28 
8 BUILDING AND EGRESS CHARACTERISTICS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 31 
8.1 Building Height .......................................................................................................... 31 
8.2 Number of Exits, Exit Width and Egress Distance ................................................. 32 
8.2.1 Acceptable Solutions to NZBC ..................................................................................................... 32 
8.2.2 Building Code of Australia ........................................................................................................... 33 
8.3 Building Construction and Passive Protection ........................................................ 34 
8.4 Stair Requirements .................................................................................................... 36 
8.5 Refuge Floors and Areas ........................................................................................... 39 
8.5.1 Rejitge floors ................................................................................................................................. 40 
8.5.2 Rejitge areas .................................................................................................................................. 42 
8.6 Lifts .............................................................................................................................. 43 
vi 
9 FIRE .................................................................................................................................. 50 
9.1 Internal Fire Spread ................................................................................................... 51 
9.2 External Fire Spread .................................................................................................. 51 
10 TRAINING AND EDUCATION ............................................................................................. 53 
11 INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE ..................................................................................... 57 
12 EMERGENCY STRATEGY .................................................................................................. 58 
12.1 Evacuation ................................................................................................................... 59 
12.1.1 Exposure to fire and fire products ............................................................................................... 60 
12.1.2 Evacuation through smoke ........................................................................................................... 61 
12.1.3 Flashover and fire in escape paths ............................................................................................... 62 
12.1.4 Pre-movement time ....................................................................................................................... 63 
12.1.5 Finite tenability time ..................................................................................................................... 65 
12.1.5.1 ASET ......................................................................................................................................... 66 
12.1.5.2 RSET ......................................................................................................................................... 66 
12.1.6 Disabled and elderly are more at risk ........................................................................................... 67 
12.1. 7 Evacuation can be impractical in high-rise buildings ................................................................. 67 
12.1.8 Occupants do not always evacuate ............................................................................................... 68 
12.2 Non-Evacuation .......................................................................................................... 69 
12.2.1 Case study ..................................................................................................................................... 72 
12.2.2 Case srt111111a1y discussion ............................................................................................................. 74 
12.3 Staged Evacuation ...................................................................................................... 75 
13 FIRE SAFETY MATRIX ...................................................................................................... 77 
13.1 Emergency strategy .................................................................................................... 77 
13.2 Occupants at risk ........................................................................................................ 78 
13.3 Matrix variables .......................................................................................................... 78 
13.4 Buildings greater than 25m ....................................................................................... 81 
13.5 Buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m ......................................... 83 
13.6 Buildings less than three storeys ............................................................................... 85 
14 DISCUSSION OF FIRE SAFETY MATRIX ............................................................................ 86 
14.1 Buildings greater than 25m in height ....................................................................... 86 
14.1.1 Evacuation in buildings greater than 25m .................................................................................. 87 
14.1.2 Non-evacuation in buildings greater than 25111 ........................................................................... 88 
14.2 Buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m ......................................... 89 
14.2.1 Evacuation in buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m ...................................... 89 
14.2.2 Non evacuation in buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m ............................... 90 
14.3 Buildings less than three storeys ............................................................................... 91 
14.3.1 Evacuation in buildings less than three storeys ........................................................................... 92 
14.3.2 Non-evacuation in buildings less than three storeys ................................................................... 92 
vii 
14.4 Risk and Reliability .................................................................................................... 93 
15 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 97 
16 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 99 
17 APPENDIX A- FIRE CASE SUMMARIES ......................................................................... 109 
18 APPENDIX B- BCA EGRESS REQUIREMENTS .............................................................. 124 
19 APPENDIX C- EXTERNAL FIRE SPREAD BUILDING CODE REQUIREMENTS ................ 127 
viii 
List of Figures and Tables 
Figure 1- Inter-relationship of fire safety elements .................................................................. 2 
Figure 2- Approved Document B single stair building requirements ..................................... 39 
Table 1 -New Zealand residential property fires ...................................................................... 7 
Table 2- New Zealand fire fatalities ......................................................................................... 7 
Table 3 - Australian residential property fires ........................................................................... 8 
Table 4 -Australian fire fatalities .............................................................................................. 8 
Table 5 -United States residential property fires ....................................................................... 9 
Table 6 -United States residential fires fatalities ...................................................................... 9 
Table 7 -United States fire fatalities ....................................................................................... 10 
Table 8- Fatalities in sprinkler protected apartment buildings US 1996 ................................ 24 
Table 9 - Times for fire brigade arrival and set up .................................................................. 29 
Table 10 -Number of escape routes ........................................................................................ 32 
Table 11 -Width of escape routes ........................................................................................... 33 
Table 12- Egress distance ....................................................................................................... 33 
Table 13 - kb values ................................................................................................................... 35 
Table 14- Matrix variables ...................................................................................................... 79 
Table 15 -Fire safety matrix: buildings greater than 25m ....................................................... 82 
Table 16 - Levels of fire safety (buildings greater than 25m) ................................................. 83 
Table 17- Cell key ................................................................................................................... 83 
Table 18 -Fire safety matrix: buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m ............ 84 
Table 19- Levels of fire safety (buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m) ...... 84 
Table 20 - Fire safety matrix: buildings less than three storeys .............................................. 85 
Table 21 -Levels of fire safety (buildings less than three storeys) ......................................... 85 
Table 22- Fatal residential fire cases .................................................................................... 109 
Table 23- Health-care facilities greater than one storey (non-residential) ........................... 121 
ix 
Nomenclature 
ABCB - Australian Building Codes Board 
AHJ -Authority Having Jurisdiction 
ASET -Available Safe Egress Time 
BCA- Building Code of Australia 
BIA- Building Industry Authority (New Zealand) 
BSI- British Standards Institution 
CO - carbon monoxide 
EWIS - Emergency Warning and Intercommunications System 
FEG- Fire Engineering Guidelines (Australia) 
FRR - Fire Resistance Rating 
HV AC -Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning 
NFIRS- National Fire Incident Reporting System (United States) 
NFPA- National Fire Protection Association (United States) 
NZ -New Zealand 
NZBC- New Zealand Building Code 
NZFS -New Zealand Fire Service 
RSET -Required Safe Egress Time 
UK- United Kingdom 
US -United States of America 
X 
AJ- area of fire cell floor (m2) 
A1z- area of horizontal openings in roof (m2) 
Av- area of vertical windows and door openings (m2) 
c- specific heat (J/kgK) 
er- fire load (MJ/m2) 
H- height of fire cell (m) 
J- number of lifts 
kh - conversion factor (min.m2·3 /MJ) 
m -number of round trips 
ta - time for lift evacuation start up ( s) 
te- equivalent fire severity 
to- travel time from lift lobby to outside (s) 
tr,j - time for round trip ( s) 
wr- ventilation factor 
ah- horizontal opening area ratio (A1/A1) 
Cf.v- vertical opening area ratio (A/A1) 
17 - lift inefficiency 
'A - thermal conductivity (W /mK) 
p - density (kg/m3) 
xi 

The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Each year, fires in residential buildings cause the greatest number of fatalities of any 
occupancy type. In the United States, over 80% of all fire deaths occur in residential 
occupancies, and approximately 20% of these fatalities occur in apartment buildings (FEMA 
et al, 1999). In Australia and New Zealand approximately 60% of fire deaths occur in 
residential buildings (King, 1997 and NZFS, 1999). In addition to fatalities in apartment 
buildings, occupants can also suffer injuries from heat and smoke during evacuation. 
Therefore by improving the fire safety of apartment buildings the number of injuries and 
fatalities can be reduced. 
Fires in apartment buildings pose numerous challenges to fire engineers. The potential 
combinations of a large number of occupants, demographic diversity, numerous ignition 
sources, high fuel loads and sleeping occupants create several issues that can be difficult to 
resolve. These issues need to be reconciled with the building codes, fire safety design and 
cost constraints of the project. 
The progression towards performance based building codes is resulting in the movement 
away from prescriptive code requirements, increasing the flexibility in apartment building 
fire safety design. This increased flexibility provides the opportunity to realise greater 
efficiencies and effectiveness in fire safety design. 
The objective of this research report is to discuss the primary issues concerning apartment 
buildings, and to provide a guidance matrix for the fire safety design of apartment buildings 
that comprehensively integrates all aspects of fire safety. The fire safety design matrix is 
presented as a three by two matrix that considers building height, sprinkler protection and 
evacuation strategy as the primary variables. The matrix provides recommended fire safety 
measures in relation to these variables, resulting in a high level of fire protection for the 
occupants. 
Figure 1 represents the eight primary elements of a fire safety strategy that should be 
considered in a fire-engineered design, and the inter-relationships between those elements. 
The emergency plan, building and egress characteristics, occupant characteristics, fire, fire 
safety systems and fire brigade intervention will all have a direct impact on the fire safety 
design of apartment buildings. The inter-relationship between elements also needs to be 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 1 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
considered, as design trade-offs are possible and the interaction of elements can influence the 
effectiveness of the design. 
The training and education aspect, of Figure 1, encompasses all of the elements. This is to 
represent the impmiance of occupant training and education in all areas of fire safety. It is 
impmiant that occupants to know the options available to them, and the appropriate actions 
to take in a fire. 
The inspection and maintenance aspect (see Figure 1) covers the building and egress 
characteristics and the fire safety systems. It is important that these elements are regularly 
checked to ensure reliability and that they function as designed. 
Emergency Plan 
Building & Egress Occupant 
Characteristics ~----1---+---\-------~ Characteristics 
Fire Safety 
Systems 
Inspection & Maintenance 
Figure 1 - Inter-relationship of fire safety elements 
Fire 
Fire Brigade 
Intervention 
Training & Education 
This research project will focus on the development of a fire safety design matrix and the 
discussion of the eight elements in Figure 1 for new apartment buildings. Each of the eight 
elements will be discussed, focusing on areas that are not extensively covered in the 
Australian and New Zealand building codes and standards. 
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1.1 Design Objectives 
The performance requirements of the Building Code of Australian (BCA, 1996) and the 
Acceptable Solutions to the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) (BIA, 1991) are concerned 
with the protection oflife safety and adjacent properties. Secondary considerations are the 
protection of fire fighters and property protection. 
This research project will focus on the life safety protection of building occupants. Property 
protection will not be considered unless it affects the life safety of the building occupants. 
The level of property protection in buildings is a matter for the building owner and their 
insurers and not a concern of the regulations (Becket al, 1992). 
The protection of fire fighters has been considered directly in the fire safety matrix if they 
are an important aspect of the design. Fire brigades are generally well equipped and trained 
to handle fires with the use of breathing apparatus, protective clothing and hose reels. Fire 
fighters also have experience and training, and they have the ability to decide when to enter a 
building and when to leave. 
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2 APARTMENT BUILDINGS 
Apmiment buildings are identified as stmctures containing three or more living units with 
independent cooking and bathroom facilities, whether designated as apartment houses, 
tenements, condominiums, or garden apartments (Bush, 1991). Apartments differ from 
multi-unit residential occupancies that are not considered homes (such as hostels and 
boarding homes), by the provision of individual cooking facilities, the number of sleeping 
rooms and the less transient nature of the occupants (Bush, 1991). 
The BCA (ABCB, 1996) classifies apartments as Class 2 buildings, "A building containing 
two or more sole occupancy units each being a separate dwelling". Similar buildings can be 
classified as Class 3 buildings, but these differ to Class 2 buildings by having shmi-term 
residents. 
The Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991), classify apartment buildings as Purpose 
Group SR. The SR purpose group includes "attached and multi-unit residential dwellings". 
Essentially these definitions are generally the same, therefore apartment buildings will be 
defined as a stmcture containing self contained multi-unit residential units, with non-
transient occupants. 
Apartment buildings can also be attached to, or a part of, other building types, for example 
retail or office buildings. This research report will assume that apartments buildings are 
separate buildings by being either independent buildings or adequately fire separated. 
Therefore the inter-relationships between multiple classification buildings will not be 
considered. 
2.1 Design Issues 
A combination of several fire safety issues make apartment buildings unique compared to 
other buildings. Some of the main issues are sleeping occupants, numerous ignition sources, 
high fuel loads, demographic and cultural diversity, protection of escaping occupants and 
high populations. 
One the main reasons for the high number of fatalities in residential buildings is sleeping 
occupants. When occupants are sleeping, there are problems in alerting them and motivating 
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them to move. This can result in long pre-movement times or occupants not even attempting 
to evacuate. 
In sleeping occupancies there is also the risk of smouldering fires. Smouldering fires can 
produce large amounts of carbon monoxide (CO), which is extremely toxic and can result in 
incapacitation in low doses. 
Residential occupancies generally have numerous sources of ignition. For example: heaters, 
cigarettes, candles, cooking facilities, electrical appliances and electrical wiring. Residential 
units can also be untidy which can exacerbate the risk of ignition. Another source of ignition 
is children, who are known to play with matches and start fires. 
High fuel loads from polyurethane furniture, plastics and other synthetic materials in modem 
residential buildings contribute to large fast growing fires. Fast growth fires reduce the time 
occupants have to evacuate safely and the time available for occupants to control or 
extinguish a fire. 
Apartment buildings will also contain a broad range of demographic and cultural groups. 
This diversity can have an affect on the egress provisions and fire safety systems provided in 
the building. Some cultural groups regularly bum incense, which are a potential fire hazard. 
Occupant age is another factor that should be considered in building design. It is well known 
that young children and elderly occupants are at a high-risk (Tremblay, 1994, 1995). 
In general, occupants in an apartment building will have similar socio-economic 
backgrounds. This is due to the property and rental value of the building governing occupant 
characteristics. Occupants in low socio-economic groups are also at higher risk of dying in 
fires (Tremblay, 1994). The main reasons for this are: unconventional heating, cooking and 
lighting methods (use of candles); apartment security measures (bars on windows preventing 
egress), buildings being over crowded and poor maintenance of the building (Tremblay, 
1993 and 1994) 
The protection of escaping occupants is another issue that needs to be considered in the 
design. Occupants should be protected in escape paths from fire and smoke, for the duration 
of the incident, to ensure the risk of injury and death is minimised. 
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High occupant load in apartment buildings is an issue, due to the potentially high number of 
fatalities that could occur in a fire. Large numbers of occupants can also result in longer 
escape times due to queuing and variable pre-movement times. 
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3 RESIDENTIAL FIRE STATISTICS 
This section presents residential fire statistics for New Zealand, Australia and the United 
States. The statistics have been obtained from the latest available published data and they 
provide an indication of the trends in residential fires. 
It is difficult to compare the statistics from the different countries directly. This is mainly due 
to different occupancy type definitions and different means of collecting the data. The 
statistics have only been used for a general comparison, and to provide an idea of the scale 
and relative importance of fires in apmtment buildings. 
3.1 New Zealand 
Table 1 -New Zealand residential property fires 
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 
Single house 5379 5617 7264 
1 or 2 units 274 324 286 
2 or more units 275 353 371 
Total 5928 6294 7921 
% fires in 1 and 2 or 9.3% 10.8% 8.3% 
more units 
(Table 4-4, 1995-1998 Emergency Incident Statistics (NZFS, 1999, 2000)) 
Table 2- New Zealand fire fatalities 
Property type 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 
Health care and detention 0 6 1 
Residential 25 35 29 
Miscellaneous 7 11 17 
Total 32 52 47 
% residential 78% 67% 61% 
(Table 46, 1995-1998 Emergency Incident Statistics (NZFS, 1999, 2000)) 
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3.2 Australia 
Table 3- Australian residential property fires 
1989-93* 1993-94 
Structural fires 58, 793 19,181 
Residential fires 35, 176 11,980 
Apartment fires 5,606 1,547 
% apartment fires of 15.9% 12.9% 
residential fires 
(Australian National Fire Statistics 1993-1994 (King, 1997), *Dowling and Ramsay (1997)-
Table 12) 
Table 4 - Australian fire fatalities 
1989-93* 1993-94 
Fatalities - 124 
Residential fatalities 244 64 
Apartment fatalities 38 6 
% residential - 51.6% 
(Australian National Fire Statistics 1993-1994 (King, 1997), *Dowling and Ramsay (1997)-
Table 12) 
Limited data was available on Australian building fires, and the latest published data was for 
1993-94. 
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3.3 United States 
Table 5 -United States residential property fires 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
Residential fires 470,000 451,000 425,500 428,000 
Apartment fires 100,000 97,000 94,000 93,000 
Other residential fires 12,000 13,000 11,500 11,000 
% apartment fires (excluding 22% 22% 23% 22% 
other residential) 
(Figure 33, 57 and 65- Fire in the United States 1987-1996 (FEMA, National Fire Data 
Centre and United Stated Fire Administration, 1999)) 
Note: "Residential Fires" includes homes, apartments, hotels, motels, residential hotels, 
donnitories and halfway houses. It does not include institutions (ie prisons, hospital, elderly 
homes and juvenile detention facilities and care facilities). 
"Other Residential Fires" includes rooming houses, dormitories, halfway houses, motels, 
hotels and miscellaneous unclassified residential unclassified properties. 
Table 6- United States residential fires fatalities 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
Residential fires 3,825 3,465 3,695 4,080 
Apartment fires 685 640 605 565 
Other residential fire 105 40 55 45 
% apartment (excluding other 18% 19% 17% 14% 
residential) 
(Figure 33, 57 and 65- Fire in the United States 1987-1996 (FEMA, National Fire Data 
Centre and United Stated Fire Administration, 1999)) 
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Table 7- United States fire fatalities 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
Fire deaths 4,635 4,275 4,585 4,990 
Residential Fires 3,825 3,465 3,695 4,080 
Other residential fires 105 40 55 45 
% residential (excluding other 80% 80% 79% 81% 
residential) 
(Figure 14, 33 and 65- Fire in the United States 1987-1996 (FEMA, National Fire Data 
Centre and United Stated Fire Administration, 1999)) 
3.4 Discussion 
The statistics in this section show the majority of fatal fires occur in residential properties. In 
the United States over 80% of all fire deaths occur in residential occupancies and 
approximately 20% of these fatalities occur in apartment buildings. 
In Australia and New Zealand the percentage of deaths in residential properties is 
approximately 60% of fire deaths. Most of the fire fatalities occur in single family dwellings 
or homes and hence they are the highest risk group. The second highest risk residential group 
is apartment buildings. In New Zealand between 1991 and 1998, 85.7% (114/133) of 
residential fatal fires occurred in single family dwellings, 11.3% (15/133) offatal fires 
occmred in apartment buildings and the remaining fatal fire occurred in temporary dwellings 
(Duncanson et al, 2000). 
The high proportion of fire fatalities in residential buildings is an area of concem for fire 
engineers and general public. The number of deaths indicates that to reduce fire fatalities, 
more resources need to be allocated to residential property protection. The allocation of 
additional resources to fire protection will provide numerous, direct and indirect benefits to 
society. 
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Beever and Britton (1999) have estimated the costs per life saved, for various fire safety 
measures in Australian residential buildings. 
• The cost per life saved for a sprinkler system installed and maintained to the 
Australian Standard is between $30 and $60 million 
• The cost per life saved for a sprinkler system supplied by a domestic plumbing 
system is approximately $2 million 
• The cost per life saved for battery powered smoke detectors installed in hallways 
will be less than the likely savings accrued through injury and property loss 
reductions. Therefore battery-powered smoke detectors are the most cost 
effective solution. 
• Mains powered smoke detectors have a cost per life saved of approximately 
$350,000 
• Introducing flammability legislation for upholstered furniture will have a cost per 
life saved of approximately $10 and $30 million 
The total cost of fire protection in buildings in Australia is estimated at 0.72% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) or $2 billion dollars each year (Becket al, 1992). This includes 
direct (0.23% GDP) and indirect (0.03% GDP) fire losses, expenditure on fire fighting 
(0.20% GDP) and expenditure on fire protection (0.26% GDP) (Becket al, 1992). 
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4 ARE CURRENT FIRE SAFETY MEASURES IN APARTMENT 
BUILDINGS ADEQUATE? 
Fire safety in apmtment buildings requires the protection of occupants in the apartment of 
fire origin, occupants escaping and occupants who remain in their apartments. The fire 
protection of these groups requires the consideration of different issues and fire safety 
measures. 
Fire safety in apartment buildings is generally concerned with the life safety of the occupants 
outside the apartment of fire origin. This is predominantly due to the difficulties in protecting 
the occupants in the apartment of origin unless sprinkler protection is provided. If a fire 
occurs in an apartment the occupants will either be alerted by a detection device or by the 
fire. If the occupants do not leave the apartment, there is a possibility that they may become 
a fatality. Therefore, the most effective method of protecting occupants in the apartment of 
fire origin, if they do not evacuate or are unable to evacuate, is by a sprinkler system. 
The obvious question that needs to be addressed is: are current fire safety measure adequate 
for the protection of occupants outside the apartment of fire origin? 
4.1 Fatalities 
To determine the effectiveness of current fire safety measures in apartment buildings, an 
analysis of fatalities and injuries in apartment buildings is required. Brennan (1999a) 
analysed US fire data to determine the proportion of fatalities that occurred in the room of 
origin or corridors. Brennan (1999a) concluded that the number of fatalities due to occupants 
escaping is small and the reason why this group receives so much attention is due to the 
media and the emotive response of people seeing occupants trapped as they are attempting to 
escape. The small proportion of fatalities occurring while occupants are escaping indicates 
the apartment of origin is the main concern and not escaping occupants. However, the 
analysis by Brennan (1999a) did not consider injuries and stress caused by occupants 
escaping in a fire. 
The statistics for the location of the victims at fire ignition, from NFPA data for 1993-97, 
are; 74% were intimate with the fire, 20% were on the same floor and 6% were in other 
locations (Proulx, 2000). These statistics suggest that the occupants closest to the fire at 
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ignition are at most risk. However, the location of the victims are unknown, therefore it is 
difficult to determine how many died in the unit of origin or in their attempt to escape. 
Generally, fatalities in apartment buildings occur in the apartment or room of fire origin. 
Brennan's (1999a) analysis of US NFIRS (National Fire Incident Reporting System) fire 
statistics over a 10 year period (1983-1993 excluding 1986) found the number of fatalities 
outside the room of origin was approximately 308 people with a maximum of 478 (48 per 
year). The maximum value was estimated to include some proportion of the unknown 
category in data. The total number of fatalities in apartments was 3,126 people. Therefore it 
is estimated that 15% of the fatalities are due to occupants attempting to escape. 
One of the problems with Brennan's (1999a) analysis is that the data does not specifically 
address fatalities outside the room of origin. Brennan (1999a) states the data could include 
occupants who are still in their apartment and have made a move to escape, and people who 
have escaped through unorthodox escape routes, such as windows. Due to accurate data not 
being available, Brennan (1999a) has had to make assumptions on the number of people 
being outside their apartments and attempting to escape. Even though assumptions have been 
made, Brennan (1999a) seems to have made a conservative assumption of the number 
occupants attempting to escape and it is possible that less than 478 fatalities occurred during 
the escape attempts. 
The statistics also do not show whether occupants were escaping from a place of relative 
safety or because conditions in their unit were becoming untenable. If fatalities occurred 
while occupants were moving from a place of relative safety, then an argument could be 
made for the use of a non-evacuation strategy. 
The catastrophic fire statistics, in the United States (see Appendix A), indicate that 
residential fires, where five or more fatalities occur, involve fatalities where occupants are 
escaping or attempting to escape. 
4.2 Injuries 
The number of injuries sustained during evacuation of apartment buildings is difficult to 
assess from the current statistics. The fire safety systems of an apartment building should not 
only protect the occupants from death, but also from injury. There have been numerous cases 
where occupants have escaped through heat and smoke resulting in injury. For example, in 
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the 25-storey apartment fire in Ottawa, Canada all occupants above the fire floor who 
attempted to evacuate encountered smoke. Four evacuees suffered smoke inhalation and two 
people suffered heart attacks (Proulx, 1999). 
The NFPA estimates that 19,300 people were injured in residential fires in 1996, and of these 
injuries 5,175 occurred in apartment buildings (Karter, 1997). In Australia, between 
1989-1993, 2,165 fire injuries occurred in residential buildings (Dowling and Ramsay, 
1997). However, the number of injuries due evacuation is not known. 
Brennan (1999a) states that the problem of smoke in escape paths is not just the risk of death, 
but also injury. Injuries can be sustained as occupants evacuate through smoke and fire, by 
using unorthodox escape routes, poor escape route design and from poor lighting. As delays 
in evacuation occur, occupants have an increased risk of being exposed to the fire and fire 
products (Brennan, 1999a). Therefore, inadequate fire safety design can result in occupants 
evacuating through smoke filled corridors resulting in injuries. 
4.3 Discussion 
An assessment of whether current fire safety measures are adequate in apartment buildings 
requires the determination of what is an acceptable risk to life, and what is an acceptable 
number of fatalities and injuries in the event of a fire. Obviously, zero fatalities would be the 
most ideal situation, but currently this is unachievable and uneconomical. 
In determining the number of fatalities that occur in the room of fire origin, or due to 
occupants attempting to escape, an impmiant distinction needs to be made between whether 
occupants are escaping: 
• Due to fire or fire products penetrating their unit (movement from danger) 
(Brennan, 1999a) 
• From units in which conditions are currently not dangerous but are perceived to 
be dangerous or become dangerous (movement from potential danger) (Brennan, 
1999a) 
• From a unit in which conditions are not dangerous and are not likely to become 
dangerous (evacuation in response to emergency procedures) (Brennan, 1999a) 
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These distinctions are important, as they determine whether a fatality was primarily caused 
by the emergency procedures or due to other factors. If high proportions of apartment 
building fatalities are caused by the emergency procedures, then there is a strong argument 
for change, but if the fatalities are caused by other factors the emergency procedures may be 
adequate. 
Brennan (1999a) believes that fatalities during egress is not a significant concern, but more 
an emotive reaction to scenes of people dying whilst attempting to escape, and very few 
fatalities actually occur in egress paths. However, it is argued that improved fire safety 
design and emergency strategies could reduce the number of fatalities and injuries in the 
event of a fire. 
The difficulty in determining whether resource allocation to fire protection is adequate, is 
that it depends on the "value" ofhuman life and the "acceptable" level of risk (Lo, 1995). In 
general, fire safety performance is based on a relative assessment against previous year's 
statistics. If the trend in the number of fatalities continues to decrease, society seems to 
accept this as being successful. 
Another method of assessment is through bench marking. The New Zealand Fire Service 
(NZFS) evaluates its performance by bench marking target indicators, for example in the 
1998-1999 Incident Investigation Summaries three key target goals were set for 2001. These 
were to decrease the number of house fires by 25%, reduce house fire fatalities by 50% and 
to reduce mean property loss by 30% (NZFS, 2000). 
Society seems to accept the level of safety that current fire safety has provided (Beck et al, 
1992). Therefore any "alternative designs" to the prescriptive requirements should at least 
maintain the present level of safety. 
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5 OCCUPANT CHARACTERISTICS 
Occupants in apartment buildings consist of people from diverse cultural, socio-economic, 
educational, demographic and religious backgrounds. This diversity in backgrounds can 
result in different behaviours and actions in the event of a fire and different sources of 
ignition. For example some religious and cultural practices involve the lighting of incense. 
In many cases apartment buildings will have occupants of similar income levels and socio-
economic backgrounds, due to the similar rent and the apartment values. This could be an 
important risk factor, as it has been demonstrated that some socio-economic groups have a 
higher risk to dying in fires. For example, low-income groups have a relatively higher risk 
(Fahy and Tremblay, 1991). 
In the design of apartment buildings consideration needs to be given for disabled occupants, 
young children and elderly people. In a fire, these people will be most at risk due to mobility 
limitations and they will be more likely to be injured or die (Proulx, 1995). In New Zealand 
between 1991 and 1996, 14.2% of residential fatalities were children under the age of 5 and 
26.5% of fatalities were people over 65 years old (Duncanson et al, 2000). In the US the 
death rate of children under 5 is twice the national average and the death rate of people over 
65 is three times the national average (Conley and Fahy, 1994). 
In standard housing, in Canada, approximately 20% of the residents are people with some 
sort of movement, perception or cognitive limitations (Proulx 1995). In addition to this, 
15.5% of the population has some sort of disability and in 1992, 11.8% of the population was 
over the age of 65 (Proulx et al, 1994). 
Males are also more likely to be killed in a fire, with a death rate that is 40% higher than 
females (Conley and Fahy, 1994). The two main reasons for this are, males are more likely 
to participate in risky behaviour (ie fire fighting and rescue) and males are more likely to be 
under the influence of alcohol and drugs (Conley and Fahy, 1994). 
In the timing of evacuation drills by Proulx and McQueen (1994), they found that gender, 
age and occupant limitations did not have a significant impact on the total evacuation time in 
non crowded buildings. Occupants who had limitations or were over 65 years of age and 
children between 2 and 5 years old, generally moved slower, but this did not have major 
impact on the evacuation time (Proulx and McQueen, 1994). Another finding by Proulx and 
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McQueen, (1994), is that, occupants tended to evacuate in groups and used the most central 
stairwell, located in their familiar path of travel to exit the building, or stairwell that led to a 
familiar area. 
5.1 Occupant Location 
In the event of a fire, occupants can be located in three general locations. Each of these 
locations will have different variables and issues that need to be designed for. The three 
possible occupant locations are: 
(i) Occupants in the apartment of fire origin 
(ii) Occupants on the floor of fire origin 
(iii) Occupants remote from the floor of fire origin 
Casualties in the compartment of fire origin are usually characterised by negligence and/or 
social problems (Proulx, 2000). Casualties in other locations are characterised by multiple 
system failures and/or victims attempting to evacuate (Proulx, 2000). 
5.1.1 Occupants in the apartment of fire origin 
Occupants in the unit of fire origin are in the highest risk group, and it is the location where 
most apartment fatalities occur (Brennan, 1999a). The characteristics and design issues that 
need to be considered for these occupants are: 
• Occupants could be sleeping or under the influence of alcohol 
• Occupants will most likely be alerted by the fire or a detection system 
• Occupants are usually familiar with the building and exit routes 
• If the occupants are not alerted, there is a high probability that they may not be 
able to escape (ie exits could be blocked or they could be overcome by smoke 
and toxic products). 
• There can be a high fuel load in apartments 
• There are numerous ignition sources in apartments 
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According to some estimates, at least 10% of all fire victims are under the influence of 
alcohol or other drugs, with 20-64 year olds being twice as impaired as the general 
population (Meacham, 1999). A 1970s study in Maryland (US) found that, 70% of the fire 
victims between the age of 30 and 60 were legally intoxicated (Meacham, 1999). Males are 
also more susceptible to being under the influence of drugs and dying in a fire. A study by 
Conley and Fahy (1994) has shown that 12.5% of male fatalities, and 4.8% female fatalities 
can be attributed to alcohol and drugs. 
It is estimated that 50% of the fire victims in apmiment buildings are located close to the fire 
(Hall, 1994). Therefore victims in apartment buildings may not have a chance to escape even 
if a smoke detectors are present (Hall, 1994). 
5.1.2 Occupants on the floor of fire origin 
The risk to occupants on the floor of fire origin depends primarily on two factors. Firstly 
whether the door to the apartment of fire origin is left open, and secondly the fire resistance 
rating between the apartments. The amount of smoke that enters the corridor depends heavily 
on whether the apartment doors are open or closed. 
• If fire and smoke is confined to the apartment of origin then the corridors will 
remain tenable and occupants should have sufficient time to escape. 
• If fire and smoke enters the escape paths then occupants on the fire floor are at 
risk of injury or death as they attempt to escape. 
• If a fire occurs in the escape paths or common areas then the occupants would 
probably be exposed to fire and/or smoke as they escape. 
Occupants may be alerted by a central alarm, other occupants, the fire brigade or other visual 
and audible fire cues. 
5.1.3 Occupants remote from the floor of fire origin 
Occupants below the fire floor are usually safe and will not be exposed to smoke or fire. The 
major potential hazard for these occupants is if mechanical systems are not properly 
designed and smoke can be circulated to lower floors. 
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Occupants above the fire floor are at risk from internal and external fire spread and smoke 
spread through the building. Smoke can spread via mechanical systems and vertical shafts in 
the building. If the door to the apmtment of fire origin is closed then smoke spread will be 
limited. 
The amount of smoke spread into exit paths will determine how long these occupants will 
have to evacuate. If a fire occurs in the escape paths then all occupants above the fire floor 
will be at risk. fu the NFP A Catastrophic Fires (see Appendix A), arson fires in stair shafts 
have resulted in occupants being trapped and unable to escape. 
Occupants remote from the fire floor may be alerted by the central alarm, other occupants, 
the fire brigade or other fire cues. 
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6 FIRE SAFETY MEASURES 
This section will discuss some of the fire safety measures available to a fire engineer for the 
design of apartment buildings. This section focuses on the performance of the fire safety 
measure and areas that are not well covered in codes and standards. 
6.1 Detection 
The detection system's primary function is to detect a fire, activate the alarm and activate 
other fire safety measures. Smoke detectors and heat detectors are the most common 
detection systems installed in apartment buildings. Smoke detectors generally have a faster 
activation time and are an important device for alerting occupants in the event of 
smouldering and flaming fires. 
Smoke detectors in residential properties are one of the most cost-effective fire protection 
measures available. Between 1986 and 1995, in US residential properties, the deaths per 100 
fires were 0.57 and 1.04 with detectors present and without detectors present respectively 
(Ahems, 1998). Therefore smoke detectors reduced the risk of dying in a residential home 
fire by 45%. However, it should be noted that in apatiment fires, smoke detectors only 
reduce the risk of dying by 14% (Ahems, 1998 and Hall, 1994). This could be attributed to 
higher occupant numbers, longer escape distances and alarms being ignored due to activation 
caused by another residents. In the US, the 8% of homes that do not have smoke detectors 
account for 50% of reported residential fires (Hall, 1994). 
In a study of risk factors associated with residential fires, Runyan et al (1992) found that 
77% of fatal fires and 50% of non fatal fires occmred in houses with no smoke detectors. 
The assessment of risk factors showed that smoke detectors were beneficial in almost every 
instance (Runyan et al, 1992). 
The main problem with smoke detectors is nuisance alarms. Nuisance alarms are the primary 
cause of why smoke detectors are deactivated and why occupants do not automatically 
assume a fire, if a detector activates (Ahems, 1998). An NFPA survey found that when a 
smoke detector activated, only 7% of occupants first reaction was that there was a fire and 
they should get out (Ahems, 1998). 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 20 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
To eliminate nuisance alarms, smoke detectors need to be placed correctly, or photoelectric 
detectors should be used (Ahems, 1998). Another possibility is to use analogue detectors and 
adjust their sensitivity to suit the application. 
In the event of a smouldering fire smoke detectors may be the only effective fire safety 
measure. Smouldering fires would not activate a sprinkler system and passive protection may 
be defeated by open doors. 
There are numerous types of detection systems available for fire engineers to specify. The 
detection system in apartment buildings will generally have a combination of the following 
components: smoke detectors, heat detectors, sprinklers and manual call points. 
Some guidelines for detectors are: 
• Provide heat detectors in kitchens 
• A void smoke detectors near bathrooms and kitchens 
• Provide smoke detectors in bedrooms 
• Provide hardwired detectors in apartments linked to local alarms 
• Provide hardwired detectors in corridors linked to alarms in apartments and 
alarms in general areas 
• Provide local almms in apartments 
·Current analogue addressable detection systems can provide numerous advantages over a 
conventional system. However, these advantages need to be assessed with the cost of the 
system. Some of the advantages of an analogue addressable system are: 
• Individual detectors can be identified 
• The status of the detectors can be identified 
• The detector sensitivity can be set and adjusted 
• Heat and smoke detectors can be interchanged with some systems 
• The location of the activated detectors can be identified at the panel 
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The estimated reliability of smoke detectors in residential buildings is 77.8% and the 
estimated reliability in apartment buildings is 69.3% (Bukowski et al1999). 
Manual call points can provide a back up to the automatic detection system in apartment 
buildings. Manual call points should be located near the exits of the building or at the 
entrance of protected escape paths so occupants can activate them as they exit the building. 
The location of manual call points is usually provided in the relevant standards. 
6.2 Alarm System 
The objective of the alarm system is to alert occupants in the event of a fire. The alarm could 
be could be a simple system involving bells or sounders or it could be a more complex 
emergency waming and intercommunications system (EWIS). 
Proulx and Fahy (1997) found that an alarm in itself is not an informative indication of a fire 
and occupants will tend to ignore or deny the signal. On hearing an alarm, occupants will not 
move immediately, but will investigate why the alarm activated. The study by Proulx and 
Fahy (1997) found that an alarm with good audibility significantly reduces the time delay to 
start evacuation. A separate study by Proulx et al (1994), again found the time to start 
evacuation is highly dependent on the ability of occupants to hear the alarm. The decision to 
evacuate will also depend on the occupant's familiarity with the alarm (Meacham, 1999). 
Without drills or training, occupants will not be familiar with the alarm. 
The audible waming system should have a sound pressure level that exceeds the maximum 
background sound level by a minimum of 5dBA (Bukowski, 1996). The sound pressure 
should not be less than 60dBA and not more than 1 OOdBA. In buildings providing 
accommodation the minimum sound should be 70-75dBA at the bed head (Meacham, 1999). 
Alarms placed inside apartments are more efficient to alert occupants of a fire, as opposed to 
an alarm in the corridors or stairs (Proulx, 1995). This conclusion further reinforced by 
Sultan and Halliwell (1990) who studied sound levels in apartment buildings and concluded 
that for alarms to be effective they need to be installed in the apartments. To achieve a 
75dBA at the bed head and not exceed 100dBA in other areas, alarms need to be placed in 
apmtment units (Sultan and Halliwell, 1990). 
In a study on whether sleeping occupants are alerted by a 60dBA sound pressure level, Bruck 
and Horasan (1995) found 87% of people were awoken by smoke almms, awoke within one 
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minute of initiation of the smoke alarm. In addition to this, 20% of all subjects did not wake 
up to the sound of the smoke alarm. A further study by Bmck (1998) found that children (6-
17 yrs old) are unlikely to be alerted by an alarm and 85% of the sample children did not 
reliably awaken. 
A study by Brennan (1999) of 150 fatal fires found, three quarters of those asleep and half of 
those awake did not move from the room in which they were originally located. Brennan 
(1999) suggests that the people asleep succumbed to the products of fire without waking or 
before they could take action. One of the main conclusions by Brennan (1999) is that many 
fatalities could have been avoided if occupants received an early warning from the detection 
and alarm system. 
In the study by Proulx (1995) of evacuation drills, 25% of occupants could not hear the 
alarm located in the corridor. This resulted in delays in evacuation and occupants beginning 
their evacuation when the fire brigade knocked on their door. In addition to this, Proulx 
(1995) concluded that in some cases alarms placed in corridors or stairs can be counter 
productive as it prevents the exchange of verbal information, and mobility impaired people 
in lobbies, have to endure the alarm. 
Occupant reaction to an almm system is a function of the alarm type. Proulx and Sime 
(1991) found that the most effective alarm system was a directive alarm (public address 
system) or a directive alarm with staff assistance. The most ineffective system is an alarm 
with bells only (Canter, 1990). When occupants hear alarm bells, without any further 
instmctions, they wait for further information before evacuating, resulting in delayed 
evacuation. The conclusion of Proulx and Sime (1991) is that greater evacuation efficiency 
can be achieved if occupants are provided with an informative alarm system. 
Another example of the ineffectiveness ofuninfmmative alarms was in the 25-storey, 296 
unit, high-rise apartment fire in Ottawa, Canada. In this fire only 4% of the occupants 
initiated evacuation based on the building alarm (Proulx, 1998). This fire again showed that 
occupants treat the sounding of alarms as a signal to wait for further information and not to 
evacuate (Proulx, 1998). 
The nature of the information provided to occupants is also impmiant. The infmmation needs 
to be clear, simple, consistent and from a reliable source (Proulx and Sime, 1991). This will 
ensure occupants have confidence in the system and react as instmcted. Clear, up to date, 
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accurate information can reduce the time for occupants to authenticate the situation and 
make decisions (Saunders, 1997). 
Complicated or unique emergency strategies may require an Emergency Warning and 
Intercommunication System (EWIS). This will enhance the effectiveness of the alarm system 
and reduce the chance of confusion. 
A potential problem for alarm system is occupants who have hearing impairments. If 
occupants cannot hear the alarm or instructions, they probably will not react in accordance 
with the emergency procedures or instructions and be put at risk. In this situation, the safety 
of occupants can be enhanced by: having other occupants provide assistance, installing alarm 
lights in apartments and through education and training, to ensure the occupant knows how 
to react if they see smoke or fire. 
6.3 Sprinkler Protection 
Sprinkler protection in apartment buildings has an exemplary record in Australia and New 
Zealand. Between 1886 and 1986 there have been no fatalities in sprinkler protected 
apartment buildings (Marryatt, 1988). In the US there have been some fatalities in sprinkler 
protected apartment buildings, but the level of life safety provided by sprinklers are well in 
excess of any other active fire safety measure. A properly installed sprinkler system is the 
most effective device for protecting and safeguarding against loss oflife and property (Cote, 
1997). 
Table 8 -Fatalities in sprinkler protected apartment buildings US 1996 
Sprinkler Protected 1994 us 1996 us Australia and NZ 
Apartments (1886-1986) 
Fires 2,222 2,258 33 
Deaths 4 3 0 
(Figure 61- Fire in the United States 1987-1996, Figure 62- FEMA et al, 1999 and 
Marryatt, 1988) 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above figures is that sprinklers are extremely 
effective. In the US, Australia and New Zealand the fatalities in sprinkler protected 
apartment buildings are minimal, and can be considered to be almost 100% effective. In fully 
sprinkler protected residential buildings the NFP A has no record of a fire killing more than 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 24 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
two people (Hall, 1993). Hall (1993) estimates that a sprinkler protection reduces property 
loss in apartment buildings by 40% and the chance of death in a fire by 55%. The 
combination of sprinklers and smoke detectors in homes will reduce the chance of death in a 
fire by approximately 82% (Hall, 1993). 
Marryatt (1998) has quoted sprinklers as being 99.5% reliable, however this applies to 
occupancies where inspection, maintenance and testing activities were well documented. The 
study by Bukowski et al (1999), found that the overall reliability of sprinklers is 
approximately 94.6%. Based on a 1959 study, Bukowski et al (1999) estimate the reliability 
of residential sprinklers to be 96.6%. However, this value is based on limited residential 
sprinkler data that may not apply to contemporary sprinkler systems. 
Some of the concerns in estimating the reliability of residential sprinklers are: permitted area 
coverage, poor water supplies, no remote alarm and low levels of maintenance (Bukowski et 
al, 1999). These concerns are more applicable to single family dwellings and not necessarily 
apartment buildings. Sprinkler systems installed in residential buildings to the Australian and 
New Zealand Standards have to meet the coverage, water supply and maintenance 
requirements of the Standard. 
Sprinkler protection will not necessarily eliminate all fire fatalities and ce1iain types of fires 
are likely to produce casualties. For example people intimate with the fire (ie people close to 
the fire), smouldering fires and fast flaming fire in non-sprinkler protected areas could still 
result in casualties (Hall, 1993). 
The Building Code of Australia's prescriptive requirements, specifies sprinkler protection for 
all apartment buildings with an effective height greater then 25m (ABCB, 1996). The 25m 
height is partly based on the fire brigade's ability to rescue occupants externally using 
ladders. Therefore, as the ability of the fire brigade to rescue occupants is limited, an 
increase in the level of fire protection is required, thus sprinklers are specified. 
The Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991) require sprinkler protection in SR 
Purpose Group buildings greater than 34m. For intermediate floors different requirements 
apply. 
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6.4 Smoke Control 
Smoke control in buildings can be in the form of dilution (smoke extraction), airflow, 
pressurisation, buoyancy and compartmentation (Klote and Milke, 1992). Depending on the 
building characteristics and architectural features of the building, any of these systems, or a 
combination of these systems, can be used to control smoke in the event of a fire. 
The Building Code of Australia's (ABCB, 1996) prescriptive requirements specify fire 
isolated exits in apartment buildings greater than 25m to be pressurised. The Acceptable 
Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991) only require smoke control in apartment buildings (SR 
purpose group) when intermediate floors are present. 
The most common forms of smoke control in apartment buildings are pressurisation of 
corridors and/or stair shaft. 
A study of smoke control reliability by Zhao (1998) found: 
• Zoned smoke control systems have a reliability of between 52% and 62% for a 
building between 5 and 20 storeys. 
• The reliability of a stair pressurisation system is approximately 90% 
Zhao (1998) determined the reliability for stair pressurisation and zoned smoke control 
systems from a fault tree analysis. Two conclusions from Zhao's (1998) study are that 
maintenance has a significant influence on the reliability of the system and dampers are the 
most umeliable component of the system. To improve the reliability of the system, the most 
effective solutions would be to decrease the maintenance period and/or install dampers with 
greater reliability. 
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In the Carlyle Apartment fire (Taylor, 1975), a fire in one of the apartments burnt out the 
apartment and the door to the corridor. Due to the corridor being effectively pressurised, the 
effects of fire and smoke into the corridor were minimised. The corridor pressurisation was 
stated to be so effective that occupants were able to walk past the apartment and observe 
what was burning inside. From this fire, and further experiments, Taylor (1975) concluded 
that: 
• Positive pressurised corridors, using a "make up" air system, can contain a fire 
within a unit if: 
The system is properly balanced and 
The fire occurs above the neutral plane 
• With pressurised corridors the following are essential: 
Stairwells should be at a higher pressure than corridors 
Corridor construction should be non-combustible 
Exhaust system should be non-combustible 
All access doors to corridors should have self-closers 
Each fire compartment should have exterior windows and vents 
In this study, Taylor (1975) also believes that "sprinklers would be of dubious value in a 
properly pressurised corridor". 
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7 FIRE BRIGADE INTERVENTION 
In most fire engineered buildings, intervention of the fire brigade is not usually considered. 
The fire brigade provides the last line of attack on a fire, and usually the last opportunity to 
find and rescue occupants. The intervention of the fire brigade is highly dependent on them 
receiving an alarm or notification of a fire. 
The role of the fire brigade is important in an apartment fire as they can: 
• Fight, suppress and extinguish the fire 
• Perfmm search and rescue operations 
• Externally rescue occupants 
• Control evacuation via the EWIS system or lifts 
• Perform first aid 
• Reassure occupants 
For the fire brigade to perfmm their jobs properly they require: 
• Adequate site access 
• Adequate water supplies 
• Suitably located fire system control centres and indicator panels 
• Controls for lifts 
• Protection from structural failure for an appropriate length of time 
The Australian and New Zealand building codes and standards provide design criteria for the 
above requirements. Successful fire brigade intervention can be achieved with pre-planning, 
early alarm, rapid response and the provision of sufficient labour and equipment to deal with 
the hazard (Becket al, 1992). 
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The time for the fire brigade to arrive and extinguish the fire is influenced by the following 
components: 
• Time to detection of fire. Either by automatic systems or people (Buchanan, 
1996). 
• Time to notification of fire brigade (Buchanan, 1996). 
• Fire brigade travel time (Buchanan, 1996). 
• Access and search time for all floors (Buchanan, 1996). 
• Fire brigade setup time 
• Fire attack time (Buchanan, 1996). 
The Fire Engineering Guidelines (FCRC, 1996) contains a "Fire Brigade Communication 
and Response" model which provides guidance on assessing the response of the fire brigade. 
The following fire brigade times are 95th percentile times taken from the PEG (FCRC, 1996). 
Table 9- Times for fire brigade arrival and set up 
Time (minutes) 
Environment Arrival Setup 
City 10 20 
Country 20 15 
In a non-evacuation strategy, the fire brigade maybe relied upon to suppress and extinguish 
the fire. Therefore notification and arrival times are crucial. 
The arrival of the fire brigade may also be crucial in an emergency strategy where they are 
required to communicate with the occupants or assist the evacuation. If communication with 
occupants is vital to the emergency strategy, appropriately trained wardens should take 
charge prior to the arrival of the fire brigade. 
The intervention of the fire brigade needs to be negotiated with the approval authority or 
Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) and fire brigade. The times for intervention need to be 
agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. 
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The activities of the fire brigade can be aided through sensible designs and architecture. For 
example, location of hydrants, hose reels and fire indicator panels should be designed such 
that they assist the operations of the fire brigade. 
Some of the problems faced by the fire brigade during a fire are: fighting the fire whilst 
assisting the evacuation, access to the fire floor being restricted with evacuating occupants 
and reduced effectiveness due to fatigue after climbing stairs. 
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8 BUILDING AND EGRESS CHARACTERISTICS 
The building and egress characteristics are two of the most influential variables on the 
evacuation strategy and fire safety measures provided in a building. The primary building 
and egress characteristics that influence the fire safety design are: 
• Building height 
• Number of exits 
• Exit widths 
• Egress distance 
• Building construction and passive protection 
• Refuge floors and/or refuge areas 
• Lifts 
8.1 Building Height 
In Australia and New Zealand the building height is major determinant of the fire safety 
systems. When buildings are greater than 25m in effective height, there is a significant 
increase in the prescriptive requirements specified by the Building Code of Australia. 
The 25m building height limit is partly based on the limits of ladder access, and the ability of 
the fire brigade to rescue occupants and fight the fire externally. In Australian buildings 
greater than 25m, the prescriptive requirements require the buildings to be sprinkler 
protected and to have pressurised escape paths. 
The fire safety matrix presented in this report considers three building heights, with the 
height limits being based on the BCA and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC. It should 
be noted that the guidelines presented in the matrix do not strictly apply to these limits, and it 
is the responsibility of the fire engineer and approval authority to determine if an adequate 
level of safety has been achieved. 
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The building height limits that have been considered are: 
• Buildings less than 3 storeys. These buildings are characterised by unprotected 
escape paths and travel distances generally meeting code requirements. The 
buildings have short travel distances and external rescue is generally possible. 
• Buildings greater than 3 storeys, less than 25m high. These buildings are 
characterised by having protected stairs, lifts and external rescue being possible 
• Buildings greater than 25m high. These buildings are characterised by having 
protected stairs, lifts, relatively long travel distances and limited external rescue 
options. 
8.2 Number of Exits, Exit Width and Egress Distance 
The Building Code of Australia and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC comprehensively 
cover the number of exits, minimum exit widths and maximum egress distances for 
apartment buildings. If the egress characteristics of a building are not fire engineered from 
first principles, then it is recommended that the code requirements be used as default values. 
The following is a summary ofthe Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 1996) and the 
Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991) requirements. The summary applies to Class 
2 buildings (BCA) and SR Purpose Group buildings (Acceptable Solutions to NZBC). 
8.2.1 Acceptable Solutions to NZBC 
Prescriptive egress requirements for SR purpose groups. 
Table 10- Number of escape routes 
Minimum number of escape routes 
Up to 100 beds 2 
Over 1 00 beds 2 plus 1 for every 100 beds, or part 
thereof over 100. 
(Table 1- Acceptable Solutions C2/AS1) 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 32 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
Table 11 -Width of escape routes 
Minimum width 
Horizontal travel Vertical travel 
Based on activity 850mm lOOOmm 
Based on occupant load 7 mm/person 9mm/person 
(Table 2 -Acceptable Solutions C2/ AS 1) 
Table 12- Egress distance 
Dead end open path Total open path Protected path 
24m 60m 60m 
(Table 3- Acceptable Solutions C2/AS1) 
The Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC maximum egress distances are for SR purpose 
groups. The open path distance is calculated from the furthermost point inside the apartment. 
Open path lengths and horizontal safe path lengths can be increased by: 
• 15% where heat detectors are installed 
• 50% where sprinklers are installed 
• 1 00% where smoke detectors are installed 
• 100% where the occupant density does not exceed 0.05 people/m
2 
8.2.2 Building Code of Australia 
The clauses for the number of exits, exit-travel distances and the dimensions of exit paths, 
extracted from the BCA, are located in Appendix B. 
In summary: 
• All buildings require at least one exit. Buildings over 25m high require two exits. 
The maximum allowable exit travel distance may govern the number of exits. 
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• The maximum travel distance from a sole-occupancy unit is 6m, to a point where 
travel in different directions to two exits is available. The maximum distance 
between alternative exits is 45m. 
• The minimum width of an exit is 1. Om or 1. 8m in a passageway. The minimum 
width of the exit increases when occupant numbers are in excess of 100 on a 
storey. 
8.3 Building Construction and Passive Protection 
All apartment buildings will have a fire resistance rating for building structure and fire 
barriers. This fire resistance can either be determined from the relevant Building Code or 
through a fire engineering analysis. 
Passive protection is one of the most important elements in the prevention of fire spread and 
limiting fire size. By breaking up the building into vertical and horizontal compartments, the 
fuel is broken down into smaller units that will reduce the potential fire size. Passive 
protection is also essential in preventing and limiting smoke spread through the building. 
In the context of this report, the main objective for passive protection is to limit the fire and 
smoke to the apartment of fire origin or at least the floor of fire origin. This will reduce the 
threat to other occupants in the building, and provide enough time for them escape, or for the 
fire brigade to suppress the fire. 
The compartment and structural fire resistance rating of an apartment can be determined 
from the time equivalence formula. By using this method, an apartment should be designed 
to contain a fire until complete bum out. This should therefore ensure the fire does not 
spread beyond the apartment of origin. 
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Eurocode (1993) time equivalence formula (taken from Buchanan, 1994): 
(equation 1) 
te = equivalent fire severity 
ef =fire load (MJ/m2) ~ 300-500 MJ/m2 for apartments (Buchanan, 1996) 
kb = conversion factor (min.m23 /MJ) 
w1= ventilation factor 
Table 13 - kb values 
(A-pc) 112 [J/m2Ks 112] Typical constmction 
<720 Insulating material 
720 to 2500 Concrete or Plasterboard 
> 2500 Thin steel 
'A - Thermal conductivity (W /mK) 
p - Density (kg/m3) 
c- Specific heat (J/kgK) 
Ventilation Factor 
wf =(6.0)0.3[0.62+ 90(0.4-a"t]>0.5 
H 1+bvah 
bv = 12.5(1 + 10av -a,~) 
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kh [min ~·3 /MJ] 
0.090 
0.055 
0.045 
(equation 2) 
(equation 3) 
(equation 4) 
(equation 5) 
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Av- area of vertical windows and door openings (m2 ) 
A1 - area of firecellfloor (m
2 ) 
A11 -area of horizontal openings in the roof (m 2 ) 
H- height of fire cell (m) 
Fire separation and compartmentation relies on doors, walls, floors, ceilings, glazing, smoke 
dampers and construction units (Bukowski et al, 1999). For effective passive protection these 
factors need to be inspected, tested and maintained regularly. It is recommended that self-
closers be used on doors that open into common areas, to prevent fire and smoke spread from 
apartments to common areas or escape paths. 
There is very little literature on the reliability of passive protection (Bukowski et al, 1999). A 
survey of experts has estimated the reliability of passive protection to be 95% for 
construction with no openings, and 90% for construction with openings and with self-closers 
(FCRC, 1996). Similarly, a Delphi group study in the UK estimated the reliability of 
masonry and gypsum construction to have a reliability of 81% and 69% respectively 
(Bukowski et al, 1999). 
The fire safety matrix makes a distinction between low and high passive protection. This 
distinction is used to demonstrate different relative levels of safety between an occupant in 
an adjacent apartment and one who is in a corridor. If an occupant is in a corridor, at a 
minimum, they will have one wall and one door (assuming it is closed or has a self-closer) 
separating them from the fire. If the occupant remains in their room they will have two walls 
and two doors (assuming it is closed or has a self-closer) separating them from the fire and 
hence a higher level of protection. The door from the apartment of fire origin door could be 
either open or closed, which increases the risk to occupants in the corridor and hence the 
term low protection is used. 
8.4 Stair Requirements 
In an emergency, the primary means of egress in multi-storey occupancies are stairs. 
Different building codes have different requirements for the number of stairs and the width 
of stairs (Refer Section 8.2 and Appendix B). 
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The Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 1996) requires apartment buildings (Class 3) to 
have at least one exit from every storey and two exits where the building exceeds 25m. 
However, the maximum travel distances from the door of an apartment permitted by the 
prescriptive requirements are: 
• 6m to an exit, or a point from which travel in different directions to two exits is 
available, or 
• 20m from a single exit serving the storey at the level of egress to a road or open 
space. 
Therefore, even though two exits are required in apartment buildings greater than 25m high, 
in many cases to meet travel distances specified by the BCA, two stairs will be necessary. 
The minimum number of exits, in the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991 ), are 
based on the number of beds (ie the occupant load) in the apartment building. For apartments 
with less than 100 beds two exits are required. For apartments with over 100 beds two exits 
are required, plus an additional exit for every 100 beds or part thereof greater than 100. 
The objective of two stairs is to provide an alternative means of egress if one exit is blocked. 
Having multiple stair shafts can also reduce egress distances and allow occupants to change 
egress routes depending on the conditions. 
The three main factors building codes use to determine if two or more stairs are required, are 
the number of occupants, the number of floors and the characteristics of the occupants. Some 
ofthe additional areas that should be considered in determining the stair requirements are: 
• Fire brigade utilisation and rescue operations 
• Sprinkler protection 
• Fire resistance rating of exit paths 
• Smoke control systems in the exlt paths 
• Emergency plan 
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To dete1mine the relative effectiveness of a single stair, Hagiwara et al (1997) have proposed 
a probabilistic model based on the expected number of occupants unable to escape. The 
model provides a basis for evaluating a single stair against the building code based on: 
• The probability of a fire occurrence in the room 
• The probability the fire develops into a hazardous fire 
• The probability the door is left open 
• The efficiency of rescue by the fire brigade 
• The degree of protection of the escape route 
Single stair buildings are permitted in the UK provided certain conditions are met. Clause 
3.18 of Approved Document B (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 
2000) states: 
3.18 Eve1y dwelling should have access to altemative escape routes so that a person confronted by the effects 
of an outbreak of fire in another dwelling can tum away from it and make safe escape. 
However, a single escape route ji'Oin dwelling entrance door is acceptable if either: 
(a) the dwelling is separated fi·om the common stair and: 
(i) eve1y dwelling is separated fi'om the common stair by a protected lobby or common corridor (see 
diagram 12), and 
(ii) the travel distance limitations in Table, on escape in one direction only, are observed; 
Effectively, this means that the required number of stairs is not a function of the building 
height, provided travel distances and other building requirements are met. Therefore, it is 
possible to have tall single stair apartment buildings. Figure 2 shows the maximum travel 
distances and stair requirements of Approved Document B (Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, 2000). 
Some of the important requirements for single stair buildings is the provision of openable 
vents and/or automatic opening vents in the stairs and the corridors. These vents provide a 
means of venting the stairs of smoke, for both occupants and fire brigade. 
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Figure 2- Approved Document B single stair building requirements 
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8.5 Refuge Floors and Areas 
vent at 
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Refuge floors and areas provide rest locations for escaping occupants, a safe area for both 
disabled and able-bodied occupants and a staging area for the fire brigade. The BCA and the 
Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC do not prescribe refuge floors, however they are 
prescribed in the Hong Kong building code (Lo and Will, 1997). In a fire engineered 
apartment building refuge floors may be justifiable if the building was an ultra high-rise 
building, with excessive travel distance via stairs. 
Refuge areas are more cominonly used in Australia and New Zealand to provide safe areas 
for disabled occupants. In apartment buildings a common emergency strategy is for disabled 
occupants is to remain in their apartments until assistance arrives. 
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8.5.1 Refugejloors 
The Building Code of Australia and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC do not specify 
refuge floors for apartment buildings. However, they are prescriptive requirements for high-
rise buildings in the Hong Kong Code of Practice (Lo and Will, 1997). 
The Hong Kong Code of Practice specifies that refuge floors should be in all buildings above 
25 storeys, at intervals of not less 20 storeys and not more than 25 storeys (Lo and Will, 
1997). The basis for the number of storeys is travel distance and the estimated fatigue of the 
occupants (Lo and Will, 1997). 
The functions of refuge floors (Lo and Will, 1997) are to: 
• Act as a relief area for the evacuees in a fire situation 
• Act as a sub-base for fire fighting purposes 
• Act as a command point for the rescue personnel to assist the evacuation of the 
building 
• Provide a place for disabled or partially disabled occupants to wait for assistance 
before being evacuated 
• Allow occupants to move to an alternative staircase 
• Allow smoke separation at the refuge level in the stair case 
Lo and Will (1997) also state that refuge floors can psychologically assist occupants under 
escape conditions. Refuge floors can psychologically relieve occupants by: 
• Reassuring them that the height of escape is not too onerous 
• Providing an area for cognitive and decision control 
• Seeing the presence of fire brigade personnel 
Refuge floors can also be used as a safe area where lifts are controlled and co-ordinated for 
egress. Passenger lifts not used on the fire floor can be used at the refuge floor to evacuate 
occupants (Lo and Will, 1997). High-rise buildings are usually broken up into low-rise, mid-
rise and high-rise sections, with lifts that serve each section separately. To assist in rescue 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 40 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
operations, lifts that do not serve the fire floor can be used for rescue and mobilisation of fire 
brigade personnel and equipment. 
The arguments against refuge floors (Lo and Will, 1997) are that: 
• They provide an additional cost to the building owner in terms of building cost 
and non-utilised space 
• It can be difficult to maintain and enforce the use of refuge floors 
• There are already protected escape routes 
• Unless people have difficulty in escaping they are unlikely to remain on the 
refuge floor 
For residential buildings, Lo and Will (1997) believe that refuge floors may be necessary to 
provide an area of safety if conditions become untenable due to long pre-movement times. 
Another approach to using refuge floors is to reduce the effective height of high-rise 
buildings (Teh, 1994). Since the height is directly proportional to egress time, the provision 
of adequately protected refuge areas can reduce the effective building height. Therefore once 
occupants have reached a refuge floor they can be considered to be safe. To achieve this Teh 
(1994) proposes the following requirements: 
• Additional provisions to prevent smoke infiltration (smoke stopping of all 
vertical shafts) 
• All lifts connecting to the refuge floor to be accessible through smoke lobbies 
• The refuge floor must be accessible at all times and capable of accommodating 
the projected number of people 
• A substantial part of the refuge floor is to be natural vented or capable ofbeing 
naturally vented (ideally the refuge area should be a part of an external area) 
• The design and layout of exit stairs should discharge occupants into the refuge 
floor before they proceed further down 
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• Pressurisation of exit stairs can be separated into vertical zones to avoid failures 
of the system affecting the whole stair 
Refuge floors in apartment buildings may assist the evacuation of occupants, but 
requirements of refuge floors need to be assessed against: other fire safety measures, the cost 
of a refuge floor and the emergency strategy. With the provision of sprinklers, 
compartmentation and smoke control, the need for a refuge floor in apartment buildings is 
questionable. Apartment buildings are generally fire separated between individual units, at 
each floor level and between escape paths. The areas that are fire separated from each other 
could be designed as refuge areas reducing the need for an entire refuge floor. Occupants 
also have option to remain in their apartments, where they have access to fresh air from 
windows. 
The cost of a refuge floor also needs to be considered in conjunction with the cost of other 
fire safety systems. The opportunity cost of a refuge floor is the: loss of rental space, loss of 
real estate and cost of maintaining the floor. These cost could easily outweigh the cost of a 
sprinkler system that may provide a higher level protection. 
In high-rise buildings fires, where smoke control systems have failed, a refuge floor with 
adequate natural cross ventilation, could have assisted occupant egress. The World Trade 
Centre bombing (Fahy and Proulx, 1996) and the MGM Grand fire (NFPA, 1982a) are two 
possible cases where injury and fatalities may have been avoided, if the occupants were able 
to get to a refuge floor with adequate ventilation. In these two fires, exits were compromised 
by smoke and occupants were evacuating through poor conditions. 
In ultra high-rise buildings, defined as greater than 40 storeys (Lo and Will, 1997), refuge 
floors could be of some assistance for disabled, elderly and other occupants who need 
assistance to evacuate. However, these occupants may be better served through refuge areas 
on each floor or by the occupants remaining in their apartments. Lo and Will (1997) argue 
that refuge areas do not have the same psychological benefits for the escaping occupants, as 
a refuge floor, and therefore are not as effective. 
8.5.2 Refuge areas 
The Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991) require refuge areas in apartment 
buildings greater than 58m high with intermediate floors. These refuge areas are to be 
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located at intervals of no greater than 3 floors in the vertical safe paths, be at least 800mm 
wide and have an area of no less than 2m2• Guidance on refuge areas is also provided in 
British Standard BS5588- Part 8, 1998 (BSI, 1988). 
The NFPA Life Safety Code (Cote, 1997) requires people with severe mobility impairment 
to have at least two means of accessible egress. One method to achieve this is through the 
provision of a compliant refuge area. 
Some of the problems of refuge areas or staging areas are: 
• The effectiveness of refuge areas is highly dependent on the design details. Some 
of details that need to be considered are fire exposure, reliability of the smoke 
control system, outside wind and temperature condition. Without pressurisation 
all refuge areas can be subject to lethal failure (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993). 
• In many cases, the people needing the refuge areas may be unable to reach the 
area before their pathways become untenable (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993) 
• The organisation and human behaviour problems involved with refuge areas are 
more complex (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993). 
• The operation of a sprinkler system eliminates the life threat to all occupants and 
can provide superior protection for people with disabilities as compared to a 
refuge area. (Nelson, 1993 and Klote, 1993) 
Klote (1993) found pressurisation of refuge areas could be significantly influenced by, 
opening and closing of doors, window breakage and external wind pressures. Generally, 
refuge areas can be effectively pressurised by a direct pressurisation system or an indirect 
pressurisation system using lift shafts. But an indirect pressurisation system using the 
stairwell may not be effective or appropriate (Klote, 1993). 
8.6 ~ifts 
The use of lifts or elevators for emergencies is not a new concept, but they are typically only 
used with fire brigade assistance. In general, occupants are told not to use lifts in a fire. 
However, the fire brigade has often used lifts to rescue people and mobilise equipment. Lifts 
have also been used in hospitals to move non-ambulatory patients. 
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The use of lifts for fire fighting and assisting rescue operations provides an efficient means 
of moving people and equipment. This is particularly important in high-rise buildings, where 
moving equipment takes time and uses valuable resources. An example of this was the First 
Interstate Bank, where lifts were not used, and a fire on the 12th floor required 100 men to 
carry equipment up the stairs (Degenkolb, 1991). 
The BCA requires buildings with an effective height greater then 25m to have one or more 
lifts, fitted as an emergency lift (Performance Requirement EP3.2, BCA, 1996). This is to 
facilitate the activities of the fire brigade and other emergency service personnel. In addition 
to this, stretcher facilities must be provided in at least one of those emergency lifts, or in a 
non emergency lift where the effective building height is greater than 12m. 
The British Standard BS 5588- Part 8 1988 (BSI, 1988), provides guidance on the use of 
lifts for evacuation of disabled people. BS 5588 Part 8 provides guidance on the design of 
lifts used for evacuations as well as the management of evacuation lifts, and examples of fire 
plan strategies in buildings with evacuation lifts. 
The some of the problems with the use oflifts for egress are: 
• Pressurisation of shafts is not necessarily effective for smoke control (Klote et al, 
1993) 
• Lift components can be affected by heat, smoke and water (Klote et al, 1993) 
• Power failure (Klote et al, 1993) 
• Potential of lifts opening onto the fire floor 
• The evacuation needs to be controlled and co-ordinated and the number of 
occupants entering the lift needs to be regulated 
• Lift shafts can act as chimneys exposing occupants to heat and smoke. 
• Occupants have been told for the last 20 years not to use lifts in a fire (Klote et 
al, 1993) 
• Pressure differentials in lift shafts can vary with building geometry and at 
different floors (Klote, 1983) 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 44 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
• Lift microprocessor controls are very sensitive to heat (Semple, 1993) 
• Fire brigade shutting off the power can be a problem. Batteries will only run for a 
limited length of time (Semple, 1993). 
• Malfunctions in an emergency could lead to litigation (Semple, 1993). 
• There is limited opportunity for rescue of people trapped between floors (Pauls et 
al, 1991) 
The some of the other reasons why lifts are unsafe stated in the ASME Elevator Code and 
Handbook A17.1 (Cote, 1997) are: 
• Occupants may push a button and waste valuable time waiting for a lift that may 
not arrive 
• Lifts can not start until the car and hoistway (lift shaft) doors are closed. 
Overcrowding may prevent these doors from closing 
• A lift occupant could press the inconect button 
• Normal functioning of lifts such as high or low call reversal may occur at the fire 
floor 
The NFP A Life Safety Code (Cote, 1997) does not recognise lifts as a typical means of 
escape, but it does allow their use under certain circumstances. If a lift complies with Section 
7-4 of the Code, it is permitted as a second means of egress, provided: 
• The building and sunounding structure is protected throughout by an automatic 
sprinkler system 
• The building is subject to an occupancy of no more than 90 people 
• Primary egress discharges directly to the outside 
• There are no high hazard content areas in the building or attached structures 
• 100% of the egress capacity shall be provided independent of the lifts 
• An evacuation plan is implemented specifically including the lift 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 45 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
The most immediate application for the use of lifts, in the evacuation of apartment buildings, 
is for the evacuation of disabled and elderly occupants and the evacuation of low occupancy 
high-rise apartments. 
The escape times for lift egress can be calculated from the following formula (Klote et al, 
1993) 
(1 +17) Ill 
te = ta +to +--L,.t,.,j 
J j=l 
t,.,j -time for round trip (s) 
t a - time for elevator evacuation start up ( s) 
to -travel time from elevator lobby to the outside ( s) 
J -number of elevators 
11 - elevator inefficiency 
m - number of round trips 
(equation 6) 
Klote et al (1993) found that the use of lifts for egress decreases building evacuation times 
by between 10 and 50%. Greater evacuation efficiency occurs as the height of the building 
increases. The time-savings are a result of using a combination oflifts and stairs for 
evacuation. A similar result was found by Andersson and Wadensten (2000), in their 
simulations of the One Canada Square building at Canary Wharf in London, where they 
found that lifts improved the evacuation procedures in the building. 
The following are 13 criteria for safe lift egress design proposed by Chapman (1994) 
1. The building be fully sprinkler protected 
2. Lift shafts should be pressurised 
3. Lift lobbies on all floors should be enclosed 
4. Lift lobbies should be pressurised 
5. Lift and lobby pressurisation intakes should be in a smoke free location 
6. All lift lobbies should be protected by smoke detectors 
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7. Lift systems should be made water resistant 
8. When a power failure occurs all lifts should retum to their designated level 
9. All lifts should be able to be operated from a designated emergency power 
generator 
10. All lift lobbies should have access to a pressurised stair, without the occupants 
having to pass through a fire area 
11. All lift cars should have a means of two way communication 
12. All lift lobbies should have a means of two way communication 
13. A program specifying the priority of lift response during a fire should be 
developed. 
For lifts to be effective in evacuations, some other design concepts that should be considered 
are: 
• Smoke and fire separation oflift machine room and lift shaft (Klote, 1993, Klote 
et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 1994) 
• Analogue addressable detection system linked to lift control to prevent lift 
stopping on fire floors and to prioritise floors for evacuation (Klote et al, 1995, 
Levin and Groner, 1994) 
• Automatically recall lift if a fault is detected (Klote, 1993, Klote et al, 1995, 
Levin and Groner, 1994) 
• Wardens or security staff to direct evacuations, reassure occupants and prioritise 
who uses the lifts, and also to control occupant numbers in the lifts (Klote et al, 
1995, Levin and Groner, 1994) 
• Provide a system to prevent the lift stopping on floors where heat is detected, or 
providing fire rated lobbies on all floors (Klote et al, 1995, Levin and Groner, 
1994) 
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• Higher levels of protection for lift system, if building is non sprinkler protected 
(Klote et al, 1995) 
• Load weighting device, so lift bypasses all other calls when fully loaded 
(Fox,l991) 
• Lifts connected to alarm panel and sent to the top floor in an emergency and only 
responding to calls in the down direction (Fox, 1991) 
• Have machine room close to ground level, therefore if occupants are trapped in 
the lift the time to access machine room is reduced (Gatfield, 1991). 
• Reduce lobby sizes to prevent storage of combustible materials. BS5588 Part 5 
limits the lift lobby to between 5-20m2 (Gatfield, 1991) 
In some cases occupants may prefer to use lifts, instead of stairs, for egress due to the 
physical exertion ofwalking down several flights of stairs (Klote et all993). In the Forest 
Lane fire, 40% of the respondents said they used the lifts (Proulx et al, 1995). This included 
people who were assisted by rescue personnel and occupants who were not successful. 
Occupants also prefer to use entry points as exit points due to familiarity. Therefore, as lifts 
are the main point of entry for the occupants, they will be familiar with them and may prefer 
to use them as an exit (Klote et al, 1993). 
Another factor affecting whether people will show a propensity to use lifts in emergencies is 
the perceived reliability of the lifts (Levin and Groner, 1994). If lifts are shown to be reliable 
and have very few breakdowns, occupants will be more confident of using them in an 
emergency. 
In a high-rise apartment building fire in Hiroshima (Sekizawa et al, 1999), the use of lifts by 
occupants for evacuation increased with the storey height. In total, 54% of the occupants 
who escaped used lifts. 44% of these occupants said they used the lifts for means of escape 
because they use them every day, and 29% thought they were safer (Sekizawa et al, 1999). 
One of the reasons for this is that the occupants may not be aware of the emergency 
procedure not to use lifts in a fire. The study also showed that more occupants above the 6th 
floor used the lifts as opposed to stairs and all occupants between the 181h and 20th floor used 
the lifts (Sekizawa et al, 1999). 
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One of the problems with installing an emergency lift system is the education and training of 
occupants in the use of the system (Levin and Groner, 1994). To ensure the effectiveness of 
the system, occupants need to be educated about the safety features of the system, and be 
trained in the appropriate use of the system. 
It is currently feasible to design an emergency lift system for a low number of people (Klote 
et al, 1995). Therefore a lift emergency system would be most beneficial for the evacuation 
of disabled occupants from office buildings and all occupants in luxury apartment buildings, 
due to low occupancy numbers (Klote et al, 1995). However, the use oflifts for large 
numbers of people is not practical at this time, due to the required complexity of the system 
(Klote et al, 1995). Evacuation via lifts should only be an option for occupants who can not 
use the stairs, otherwise lifts will be delayed for the people who are most in need (Pauls et al, 
1991). If possible, people who require assistance should have their needs incorporated into 
the emergency plan (Pauls et al, 1991). 
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9 FIRE 
In residential buildings there are numerous sources of fire ignition. In New Zealand for the 3 
year period between 1995 and 1998, the three main locations of residential fires were: 25% 
occurred in the kitchen, 16% occmTed in the lounge and 13% occurred in the bedroom. The 
main ignition sources were cooking facilities, careless disposal of cigarettes, careless 
disposal of ash and embers and heat sources too close to combustibles (NZFS, 1999). 
A more detailed study by Duncanson et al (2000) found, between 1991 and 1998, 25.2% of 
residential fires started in the kitchen, 16.0% started in the lounge room and 12.5% started in 
the bedroom. Of the fatal residential fires, 26.3% started in the bedroom, 18.8% started in the 
kitchen and 13.5% started in the lounge or living area (Duncanson et al, 2000). 
In Australia (1989-90) 33% of fires in 1 and 2 family dwellings (Class 1 buildings) occurred 
in the kitchen, 13.6% occurred in the lounge room and 13.6% occurred in sleeping rooms 
(Beever et al, 1999). Dowling and Ramsay (1997) found that cooking and kitchen fires are 
the most common, but fires involving upholstered furniture caused more deaths and damage. 
The most hazardous fire scenarios are fires started by smoker's material on soft furnishings 
in lounge rooms and sleeping areas (Dowling and Ramsay, 1997). 
In the US, 33% of fatal apartment fires were found to have started in the bedroom (Hall, 
1994). Once again the leading cause of fire death in the US is smoking materials, which 
accounted for 25% of residential fire deaths (Conley and Fahy, 1994). 
The fire characteristics can have a significant influence on the fire safety systems and life 
safety of occupants. The fire size and growth rate will affect the activation time of safety 
systems and the time to conditions being untenable. The development stages of the fire will 
influence the fire safety design and emergency strategy of the occupants. Smouldering fires 
and fully developed fires will require different fire safety strategies. Flashover is another 
critical stage in the fire's development, and enclosure effects of the compartment can result 
in large amounts of toxic products being produced. 
The prevention of fire spread is an important design objective for designers and building 
codes. By preventing the spread of fire, tenable conditions will be maintained for a longer 
period of time. In addition to this, the damage to prope1ty will be reduced and the 
intervention of the fire brigade can be more effective. 
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9.1 Internal Fire Spread 
In any apartment building one of the primary design objectives is the prevention of fire 
spread outside the unit of origin. This objective can be met with passive barriers and/or the 
installation of a sprinkler system. 
Fire in corridors and escape paths also has to be prevented from spreading. This can be 
achieved by having non-combustible linings and the absence of combustible products in 
these areas. The flammability, flame spread and smoke development indices of corridors and 
public spaces should be based on the relevant codes and standards. Ensuring combustible 
products are' not present in the escape paths and public areas will also reduce the chance of 
ignition and fire in those areas. 
9.2 External Fire Spread 
Limiting external fire spread is another objective of the BCA and the Acceptable Solutions to 
the NZBC. The risk of vertical fire spread can be reduced with the proper design of spandrels 
and balconies, and horizontal fire spread can be prevented with adequate separation distances 
between buildings and limiting the size of unprotected openings. 
The prescriptive requirements of the BCA and the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC have 
been extracted in Appendix C. In summary, the BCA specifies a minimum spandrel height of 
900mm or a minimum horizontal projection of 11 OOmm. The Acceptable Solutions to the 
NZBC specify a minimum vertical spandrel of 2.5m or a horizontal spandrel of at least 
600mm. 
The prescriptive requirements of the Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC are based on 
Oleszkiewicz's (1991) study of spandrels and horizontal projections. Oleszkiewicz (1991) 
found that horizontal projections are extremely effective in protecting the above windows 
from flames, but for a spandrel to be equally effective they would need to be an impractical 
height. A 600mm horizontal projection reduced the exposure to an upper opening by 60% 
and a 1m projection reduced the exposure by 85% (Oleszkiewicz, 1991). A vertical spandrel 
of2.5mreduced the exposure by 50% to an upper opening (Oleszkiewicz, 1991). 
The chance of fire spread via unprotected openings can be reduced by limiting the radiant 
heat flux to an object to 12.5 kW/m2 for cellulose material, and 10.0 kW/m2 for plastics, 
exposed to piloted ignition (Buchanan, 1994). For non-piloted ignition the radiant heat flux 
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for ignition is higher. The radiation intensity from an opening can be determined from fire 
engineering calculations or Approved Document B recommends a design radiation intensity 
level of 84 kW/m2 from an unprotected opening (Department of Environment, Transport and 
the Regions, 2000). 
In a non-evacuation emergency strategy, the prevention of fire spread is particularly 
important. A non-evacuation strategy requires occupants not in the unit of fire origin to 
remain in their apartments awaiting further instructions or fire brigade assistance. If a fire is 
unable to be contained in the unit of origin or adjacent corridor then these occupants will be 
put at risk. 
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10 TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
Training and education ofbuilding occupants is an essential aspect of fire safety that is often 
overlooked. Many fire fatalities are the result of poor decision making and occupants being 
unaware of the consequences of their actions (see Appendix A). In numerous cases, fire 
fatalities have occurred, or the situation was exacerbated, by occupants not closing doors, 
disabling self-closers and removing batteries from smoke detectors. Training and education 
in the emergency plan and fire safety could reduce the number of these fatalities. In the 
Forest Lane fire, 22% of the occupants thought it is a good idea to try and exit to the roof 
(Proulx et al, 1995). However, in almost all cases roof access doors are locked. 
Another area of training that would be of benefit is the training in the prevention of fires 
(Canter, 1990). This could reduce the number of fires and indirectly increase the level oflife 
safety. Occupants can also be trained in the use of first aid fire fighting equipment (hose 
reels, extinguishers). This will enable occupants to use them effectively, and know when to 
retreat or evacuate the building. 
Training and education is also reinforced by Fahy and Proulx (1996), who noted that during 
the World Trade Centre bombing, occupants continued to egress through worsening smoke 
condiditons. Fahy and Proulx (1996) state that occupants need some level of training and 
education if they are to react safely to a fire in a building. 
People need to be aware of: 
• The emergency strategy of the building (evacuation, non-evacuation, staged 
evacuation) 
• The hazards of fire (smoke, heat, flames, carbon monoxide) 
• The fire safety measure in the building (sprinklers, smoke detectors, hose reels, 
extinguishes, manual call points) 
• The consequences of actions (closing doors, disabling smoke detectors, blocking 
escape paths, locking doors, breaking windows, leaving late) 
• What options and alternatives are or are not available in the event of a fire (for 
example refuge areas, roof access and lobbies) 
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• Techniques to minimise risk in either an evacuation or defend in place 
emergency strategy 
The decisions of people in a fire are their own responsibility, fire service personnel and fire 
engineers can not decide if, or when, a person should evacuate, or stay in place and seek 
refuge. The only person who can make this decision is the occupant faced with the smoke, 
heat and fire. Therefore, to assist occupants in making the correct decisions they need to be 
educated about fire, fire safety and the consequences of the actions they take. 
To assist occupants in making decision, the NFPA recommends the following steps for high-
rise residential buildings and hotels (Siegel-McKelvey, 1999). This type of information 
should be provided to all occupants to assist them in decision making in the event of a fire. 
In general ... 
• Familiarise yourself with buildings alarm system and evacuation plan. 
• Count the number of doors between you unit and the nearest exit (to aid 
evacuation in the dark). 
• If you discover a fire, sound the alarm and call the fire brigade. 
• If the fire is in your unit leave the area closing all doors behind you. 
• If smoke is entering your unit or the hallway, you must decide to leave or stay. If 
you leave, be alert to changing conditions and regularly re-evaluate your 
situation. If you know the fire is well below you, stay put. 
• If you encounter smoke or flames use an alternative escape route. 
Ifyou stay ... 
• Remain calm and take actions to protect yourself. 
• If possible go to a room with an outside window or balcony. 
• Close all doors between you and the fire and use tape and wet towels to cover 
vents and seal around doors. 
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• Call the fire brigade and tell them exactly where you are. 
• If possible open the window, be prepared to close it if smoke comes in. Do not 
break windows. 
• Be patient. The evacuation of high-rise buildings can take hours. 
The NFP A Life Safety Code requires that emergency instructions be available and given to 
each resident of high-rise apartment buildings (Wolf, 1999). This practice should be applied 
to other buildings and include evacuation drills and fire safety education. One of Proulx et 
al's (1994) conclusions, in the study mixed abilities evacuations, is that improved life safety 
for occupants can be achieved with annual evacuation drills to ensure occupants, recognise 
the fire alarm, know different means of egress and know the general fire emergency 
procedure. 
Training in emergency procedures makes occupants aware that there can be problems with 
safe evacuation (Hallberg, 1988). Hallberg (1988) believes the training exercise should 
involve elements of realism. For example, blocking of exits and/or lighting being turned off. 
Evaluation and documentation of training exercises can also provide information on 
deficiencies and areas requiring improvement. 
For effective fire drills, Canter (1990) has listed the following important considerations: 
• Establish that appropriate individuals understand the conditions under which first 
aid fire fighting or building evacuation is to be carried out. 
• The signal for an evacuation is taken as being clearly and unambiguously an 
indication that the building should be evacuated 
• All communications with building users are clear an unambiguous, giving direct 
instructions that are understood and followed 
• The routes to be taken for evacuation, and any phased sequence, are clearly 
understood and followed by the building users 
• The communication between critical members of the organisation and the 
utilisation of a chain of command are shown to be effective 
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• Any particular difficulties in evacuation, of special groups or particular 
individuals, are identified 
• Knowledge oflocation and appropriate use of fire fighting equipment is 
established 
• Clear and effective feedback is given to all those involved in the drill as to how it 
was carried out and what consequences there are for actions in any future 
emergency. 
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11 INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE 
Inspection and maintenance is an important aspect of fire safety to ensure the reliability and 
effectiveness of fire safety measures. If fire safety measures are not regularly inspected and 
maintained, the reliability of the systems decrease, and in the event of a fire they may not 
function as designed. 
In New Zealand, building compliance schedules specify maintenance and inspection periods 
for fire safety systems. In Australia, the maintenance and inspection of fire safety measures 
varies according to each state's legislation. All buildings should have a maintenance 
schedule, and log-books that include any essential fire safety measures specified in the fire 
engineering design. 
Inspection of passive protection in buildings is just as important as the inspection of active 
systems. Passive protection plays an important role in containing the fire and smoke, and 
protecting the escape paths for the occupants and fire brigade. Building changes or 
renovations that penetrate or alter passive baniers may need to be fire stopped and should be 
checked or approved by a fire engineer. 
One of the major problems in apartment buildings, is obtaining access to individual 
apartments for inspections and maintenance. Because each apartment is an individual unit, 
the co-ordination of inspections can be difficult and time consuming. Occupants may also 
feel that inspections are an invasion of privacy and may be reluctant to allow inspections. 
In some cases, the need for individual inspections of apartments may be reduced through the 
practical design of the fire safety systems. For example, an analogue addressable smoke 
detector system could be used to check detectors at the panel, rather than in each individual 
unit. Hard-wired smoke detectors could also be used, to reduce the problems of batteries 
being removed or going flat. 
The inspection and maintenance of common areas and escape paths, to ensure they are free 
from combustible materials, is another area of high importance. Through good housekeeping, 
the likelihood of ignition and fire spread can be reduced. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 57 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
12 EMERGENCY STRATEGY 
The emergency strategy in any building is as impmiant as the active and passive fire safety 
measures. In the event of a fire, occupants need to be informed or have some knowledge of 
what to do and the correct actions to take in different situations. 
Historically the term "Evacuation Strategy" or "Evacuation Scheme" has been used for the 
building emergency strategy. The use of these terms implies occupants should evacuate the 
building in an emergency, whereas in some cases remaining in the apartment may be a safer 
alternative. The evacuation of apartment buildings may also be impractical due to the size of 
the building and the abilities of the occupants. Therefore it is suggested that the term 
"emergency strategy", "emergency scheme" or "emergency plan" should be adopted to 
reflect the different alternatives available to occupants in the event of an emergency. 
Changes in the emergency strategy of a building can result in potential problems with 
implementation and execution of the strategy. Some of the potential problems are: 
• Changing the mindset of the occupants 
• Ensuring occupants react as planned 
• Confusion in the event of an emergency 
• Education and training of occupants 
• Notifying new occupants 
An important aspect to changing the mindset of occupants is communication, education and 
training. In some cases the natural mindset of occupants could be congruent with the 
emergency strategy. For example, occupants may prefer to remain in their apartments as it is 
a place of familiarity and it is generally perceived to be a relatively secure environment. 
In any emergency strategy, the simpler the strategy the less likely chance of confusion and 
unforeseen occupant behaviour. Where possible, an emergency information system should be 
included as a fire safety measure to provide instructions, information and reassurances to 
occupants. Proulx and Sime (1991) found that the occupant response in an evacuation was 
far more effective when an information system was used. 
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All emergency schemes are dependent on passive and active fire systems to ensure occupants 
have an adequate level of life safety in an emergency. Failure of active and passive system 
can compromise the emergency strategy and occupants may need to react to situations that 
are unplanned. Adequate training and education is essential to prepare occupants for any 
unforeseen situations. 
12.1 Evacuation 
In an emergency, occupants are usually trained to evacuate the building as soon as possible. 
In general, this concept has been effective in providing adequate life safety for the occupants, 
but in some cases this is not always the best strategy (Proulx, 2000). 
The main advantage of an evacuation strategy is that people are safe once they have 
evacuated. The failure of passive and active systems or fire and smoke spread from the unit 
of origin does not reduce their life safety. The fire brigade also has to only assist those 
occupants remaining in the building who are unable to escape and need assistance. 
Evacuation strategies are usually simple and easy to understand. Occupants simply have to 
leave the building as soon as possible after hearing the almm. Generally there are only 
problems in this strategy when smoke and fire spread affect the egress routes. 
The fire safety systems of buildings are usually designed to protect occupants using an 
evacuation strategy. This requires occupants to be protected during egress as well as in their 
apartments. Due to unpredictable pre-movement times, the time that occupants require 
protection can be significant. 
The following are some of the main reasons why occupant evacuation in apartment buildings 
may not be the best strategy: 
• Exposure to fire and fire products. Occupants may have to egress through smoke, 
resulting in death and injury. 
• Occupants will continue to move through smoke resulting in injury and possibly 
death 
• Fire and flashover can occur in escape paths 
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• Pre-movement times in apartment buildings are unpredictable. Leaving late could 
result in injury and death. Occupants may not even hear the alarm or wake up. 
• Finite tenability time. Design for safety based on Available Safe Egress Time 
(ASET) >Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) can result in fatalities if the ASET 
is insufficient. 
• Disabled and elderly occupants are more at risk 
• Evacuation can be impractical in high-rise buildings 
• Occupants do not always evacuate 
12.1.1 Exposure to fire and fire products 
During an evacuation, occupants on and above the fire floor may be exposed to the fire or 
fire products. The level of this exposure will depend to a great extent, on the actions of the 
occupant in the unit of origin. If the door is left open, fire may spread into the corridor and 
smoke will most likely spread into the corridor. The fire safety measures and the extent of 
combustible materials in the corridor will determine the extent of the fire and smoke spread. 
Once occupants are exposed to fire and fire products they are at risk to injury or death. 
Smoke is one of the main contributors to fatalities in fire. An example ofthis is the MGM 
Grand (85 fatalities) where all61 victims in the high-rise area died from smoke inhalation 
and asphyxiation. The other victims located in the casino and other areas died of 
asphyxiation, bums and carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning. Of the 61 victims in the high-rise, 
25 were found in rooms, 22 in corridors, 9 in stairways and 5 in lifts (NFP A, 1982a). 
Another case is the Rockefeller Park Towers Fire (Bell, 1983b), where five people were 
killed by smoke inhalation and by being trapped in their apartments. The failure of the 
occupant in the unit of origin to close the apartment door was a significant factor in the 
fatalities and injuries (further cases can be seen in Appendix A). 
The possibility of smoke being present in the escape path is increased by fire fighters and 
occupants opening doors, and by fire fighters using the stairs as a staging area. Without 
effective pressurisation these actions can allow smoke to enter the corridors and stair shafts. 
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Fire hydrants are often located in the stair shafts to provide a safe staging area for fire 
fighters. Therefore, as the fire fighters attack the fire, the door has to remain open and smoke 
can flow into the stair shaft, exacerbating smoke spread throughout the building. In the Polo 
Club Condominium Fire (Harvey, 1992/93), a significant amount of smoke was spread 
throughout the building as fire fighters fought the fire. 
Leakage around doors and from vents can also allow smoke to spread to the egress paths or 
into the rooms of other occupants. It is extremely important that penetrations in smoke and 
fire balTiers are protected by fire dampers, or are adequately fire stopped. 
Occupants escaping the unit of origin will have to open a door to escape. This will allow 
some smoke to enter the colTidor on the fire floor. If the escaping occupant does not close 
this door, a significant amount of smoke can enter the escape path. In the Baptist Towers 
Home for the Senior Citizens fire (Willey, 1973), the unit of fire origin door was left open 
and it resulted in the death of 9 people on the floor of fire origin (ih floor). A tenth victim 
rescued from the l01h floor died six days later. Similarly in the Rockefeller Park Towers Fire 
(Bell, 1983b ), the door was left open resulting in five casualties. 
As occupants escape the fire floor they will open the doors to the stair shafts and other 
smoke control doors. This can also allow smoke to enter stair shafts and egress paths. If self-
closers are not present on doors, open doors will make the smoke spread worse. 
In some cases the effects of smoke spread can be minimised by a pressurisation or extraction 
system. Smoke can also be controlled with baffles, and smoke production can be reduced by 
a sprinkler system. 
12.1.2 Evacuation through smoke 
Case studies have shown that occupants will evacuate through untenable conditions and 
continue to evacuate through conditions that are becoming untenable. In the World Trade 
Centre Bombing and resulting fire, over 1,000 people were treated for injuries sustained 
from the evacuation and explosion (Fahy and Proulx, 1996). The results of the occupant 
surveys showed between 94% and 70% (Towers 1 and 2 respectively) of the occupants 
moved though smoke and three quarters of those occupants who moved through smoke 
tumed back (Fahy and Proulx, 1996). The study of the World Trade Centre bombing 
highlighted the fact that people will egress through smoke and keep moving even if 
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conditions deteriorated (Fahy and Proulx, 1996). Many evacuees also thought they were 
heading straight into the fire and yet they kept going, even though the smoke got thicker 
(Fahy and Proulx, 1996). 
In many fire cases, smoke forces occupants to tum back as conditions deteriorate. In the 
Ottowa apartment fire (Proulx 1999) 25% of occupants who attempted to escape had to 
return to their apartment, and 21% had to seek refuge in a neighbour's apartment. Four 
evacuees had to be treated for smoke inhalation and two people suffered heart attacks (one of 
them died later). 
Another example is a fire in a 21 storey apartment building in Canada (Pauls, 1999). The fire 
began on the ih floor and caused the exit stai1ways and corridors to fill with smoke. A 
family in a 21st floor apartment attempted to evacuate and encountered heavy smoke on the 
151h floor. The family retreated back up the stairs, and sought refuge at the top of the stairs 
where the door to the roof was locked. The father attempted to find help on the 21st floor and 
had to find refuge in an apartment. The mother and child trapped in the stairwell died from 
smoke inhalation. In this situation the family should probably have stayed in their apartment 
and waited for assistance, rather than try to evacuate through the smoke logged stairs. 
Bryan (1992) found that the decision to move through smoke is based on the recollection of 
the distance to the exit and the ability to estimate the travel distance required. Secondary 
variables are, occupant perception of the severity of smoke and the presence of heat (Bryan, 
1992). Occupants have been known to travel distances of up to 20m with visibility ofless 
than 4m (Bryan, 1992). In the experimental study by Janse et al (1998), able-bodied 
occupants, in a corridor with a visibility of 25m, were able to walk without breathing for 20 
seconds and travel at least 30m. 
12.1.3 Flashover and fire in escape paths 
A threat to occupant life safety is fire in the escape paths. Fires in corridors and stairwells 
have often resulted in exits being blocked and occupants being trapped (refer Appendix A). 
In a New York apartment building in 1990, an arsonist lit a fire in the stairwell, trapping five 
occupants (Fahy and Tremblay, 1991). There have been numerous cases where arson fires in 
exit ways have trapped occupants (refer to Appendix A), but fire can also spread from the 
unit of origin resulting in the same problem. 
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Another potential threat is that corridors can flashover. Flashover can occur if there is 
enough combustible material or lining in the corridor and from un-bumt gasses spilling into 
the corridor (Quintiere, 1974). In the Dorothy Mae apartments (Dektar, 1983, Bell, 1983a) 
many of the 24 victims were killed when the fire flashed-over down the second and third 
floor hallways. One investigator stated that if the victims had stayed in their rooms they 
would still be alive (Dektar, 1983). 
12.1.4 Pre-movement time 
The pre-movement time of occupants is one of the most unpredictable variables of human 
behaviour and one of the most important variables in fire engineering. In apartment buildings 
the pre-movement time of occupants can vary significantly, depending on when or if the 
occupants are alerted and decide to evacuate. Due to the large variation in the pre-movement 
time of occupants, the pre-movement time can be greater than the movement time and it is 
usually a significant portion of the total evacuation time. 
Some of the occupant response time (or pre-movement time) principles summarised by Sime 
(1996) are: 
1. Deaths in large scale fires attributed to panic are more likely to be caused by 
delays in information 
2. Fire alarm sirens can not always be relied upon to prompt people to move 
immediately to safety 
3. The pre-movement time is just as important as the movement time 
4. Movement in the early stages of a fire is characterised by activities such as 
investigation, not escape 
5. As long as the exit is not seriously obstmcted, people will move to a familiar exit 
even if it is further away 
6. Individuals often move towards and with groups, and maintain proximity to 
people to whom they have emotional ties 
7. Fire exits are not always noticed and may not overcome difficulties in way-
finding 
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8. People are often prepared to move through smoke 
9. People's ability to move towards exits may vary considerably 
People closer to the fire or on the fire floor are likely to receive visual and olfactory cues and 
therefore have shorter pre-movement times. Occupants can also be warned by other 
occupants or receive more accurate information, again resulting in a shorter pre-movement 
times. 
In a study by Proulx and Fahy (1997) of five buildings, they found the delay to start 
evacuation was a function of the type of occupancy, the occupant's characteristics and the 
fire safety features in the building. The results of residential evacuation drills (Proulx and 
Fahy, 1997) found that the average time to start evacuation was between 2:30 min and 
9:40 min for mid-rise buildings and between 2:50 min and 5:20 min for high-rise buildings. 
However in the Forest Lane Fire (mid-rise 30 storey), the occupants who evacuated within 
the first hour had an average time to start evacuation of 10:30 min (Proulx and Fahy, 1997). 
48% of occupants attempted to escape in the first hour, and only 35% of them were 
successful (Proulx and Fahy, 1997). The time delay before starting evacuation in actual fires 
is often longer compared to fire drills (Proulx and Fahy, 1997). This is due to the greater 
ambiguity of the cues received by the occupants. Evacuation drills also do not consider 
occupants seeking refuge for communication, or relief from contaminants, or way finding 
being complicated by smoke and the seeking of psychological support (Bryan, 1999). 
In some cases occupants may not immediately react to the alarm, and if they are sleeping or 
under the influence of alcohol they may not even wake up (Refer to Section 6.2). On hearing 
a building alarm, occupants tend to treat it as a signal to wait for more information (Proulx, 
1999) and therefore long pre-movement times result. 
Numerous models have been developed to predict the pre-movement time of occupants. 
Sime's (1996) and the FEG (FCRC, 1996) model use a weighted scoring system based on 
occupant characteristics to derive a pre-movement efficiency weighting factor. This factor is 
then multiplied by baseline pre-movement times for various alarm and information system 
types. Other Models have been developed by Proulx and the NRCC and by MacLennan et al 
(1999). 
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Pre-movement models can provide reasonable estimates of occupant pre-movement times, 
but it is impossible to generalise individual behaviours and characteristics. Taking a 
relatively small sample of data and applying it to the general population is a rough 
approximation and does not consider variables like: group dynamics, education, sex, 
intelligence, physical abilities, cultural background, socio-economic status, toxins, perceived 
value oflife and the interdependencies of these variables. 
It has already been shown that males and females act very differently in a fire (Bryan, 1995). 
In general males, are more likely to engage in fire fighting and high risk activities, whereas 
females will assist others and call for help (Canter, 1990). 
The longer occupants take to start evacuation, the higher risk of injury and death from fire 
and smoke. Intuitively, the longer the delay, the larger the fire, the greater the amount of 
smoke that will be produced, and the more time smoke will have to enter exitways. In many 
cases, fatalities and injuries have occurred when occupants have commenced evacuation late 
and encountered smoke in escape paths. An example of this is the Forest Lane Fire (Proulx 
and Fahy, 1997) where none of occupants above the fire floor, who attempted to evacuate 
after the first half-hour, were successful. This indicates that conditions after this time had 
deteriorated and occupants risked injury if they attempted to evacuate. 
Pre-movement times can also be increased ifthe building has a history of false alarms and 
minor fires. In the high-rise apartment in Hiroshima, it is hypothesised that the history of 
minor fires resulted in relatively long pre-movement times (Sekizawa et al, 1999). Occupant 
perceptions were influenced by the history of minor fires and many occupants assumed the 
fire would be suppressed at an early stage and the threat was only minor (Sekizawa et al, 
1999). 
12.1.5 Finite tenability time 
In many cases the fire-engineering design of buildings is usually based on a comparison of 
the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) and the Required Safe Egress Time (RSET). If the 
ASET is greater than the RSET time with an adequate safety margin, the egress design of the 
building is considered safe. 
However, this only provides a limited time for tenable conditions based on the designer's 
assumptions of fire growth rate, fire size, fire spread, smoke production, smoke spread and 
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the behaviour of the occupants. Ifthe ASET is exceeded occupants can be escaping through 
untenable conditions. 
12.1.5.1 ASET 
The ASET is usually determined from the time it takes to reach predetermined untenable 
conditions. The Fire Engineering Design Guide (Buchanan, 1996) and the Fire Engineering 
Guidelines (FCRC, 1996) provide recommended tenability limits for toxicity, heat, radiation, 
smoke optical density and smoke layer height. 
The tenability conditions are usually assessed through fire and smoke modelling. Therefore 
the assumptions made in the model, and the modelling software or equations, can have a 
significant impact on the available safe egress time. The ASET value may also need to 
consider different fire scenarios in conjunction with different occupant locations and 
characteristics. 
12.1.5.2 RSET 
Attempting to predict the human behaviour of the occupants complicates the calculation of 
the RSET. The RSET can be considered to consist of the following components: alarm time, 
pre-movement time and movement time. 
• Alarm time can be predicted from fire modelling and correlations for the 
activation of active systems. This does not assess whether occupants hear the 
alarm. 
• Movement times are relatively easy to predict by using travel and flow speeds or 
"ball bearing" models. 
• Pre-movement times are difficult to predict, as occupant behaviour of individuals 
or in-groups can vary significantly. Therefore the prediction of the RSET 
becomes extremely difficult. 
In the prediction of the ASET and RSET values, there is the potential for an extremely large 
range of variation. This will affect the evacuation safety margin, and the likelihood that 
occupants will escape safely and without injury. 
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If fire brigade intervention is considered, rescue of occupants may occur after the tenability 
limits have been reached. The fire brigade is able to rescue occupants with breathing 
apparatus, and they have the ability to control the fire and extemally rescue occupants. 
12.1.6 Disabled and elderly are more at risk 
An evacuation strategy increases the risk of injury to disabled and elderly occupants in 
apartment buildings. This is primarily due to: delays in evacuation, slower movement times 
and the limited ability of these people to travel down stairs. In addition to the higher risks to 
the elderly and disabled, occupants assisting these people can be placed at risk due to 
increased delays in evacuation. 
A study of residential fires by Sekizawa (1991) found that people 65 years and older 
accounted for 47.8% of residential fire deaths. The risk of death in a residential fire for 
handicapped people is 5 times higher than the average population, and the risk for a person 
greater than 65 years of age and bedridden is 41 times higher than the average population 
(Sekizawa, 1991). In New Zealand between 1991 and 1996, 26.5% of the residential fire 
deaths consisted of people greater than 65 years of age (Duncanson et al, 2000). 
12.1.7 Evacuation can be impractical in high-rise buildings 
In high-rise buildings evacuation is not always practical. This is due to: 
• Large numbers of people, resulting in long escape times. Large numbers of 
people can cause queues in exitways and congestion in stairs. Therefore, overall 
escape times can increase. 
• Long egress distances for disabled and elderly occupants can increase their risk 
to injury from fire and smoke as well as travel via stairs. 
• In the event of a power failure, limited lighting and failure of smoke control 
systems can put evacuating occupants at risk to injury. 
• In a small fire or sprinkler controlled fire, the evacuation of a whole building 
usually would not be necessary. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 67 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
• Disruption of fire brigade operations. The fire brigade generally use exitways for 
staging areas and to move equipment. Occupants in the stairs can disrupt these 
operations and conversely the fire brigade can slow the egress of occupants. 
• Some occupants are not at risk. Occupants below the fire floor and high above 
the fire floor may not be at risk in a fire. Therefore the evacuation of these people 
is not necessarily required. 
• Delays and long evacuation time can increase the risk to occupants. The taller the 
building, the longer occupants are in exit-ways and the more likely they can be 
exposed to fire or fire products. If smoke is not contained on the fire floor it can 
spread through vertical shafts and exit ways. 
12.1.8 Occupants do not always evacuate 
In many cases occupants have not evacuated on alarm, and have only begun to evacuate 
when told to do so by the fire brigade. An apartment building fire case study by Brennan 
(1997), found that fewer than 50% of occupants evacuated the building. In a Hiroshima 
apartment building fire, 12% of occupants stayed in their apartments and did not evacuate 
(Sekizawa et al, 1999). 
Another case was the Ambleside apartment fire, where 17% of respondents decided to 
remain in their apartments despite instructions from the intercommunication system (Proulx, 
1999). The reason for their decision was smoke, and the fact that they could not manage the 
stairs or they thought it safer to stay in their apartments (Proulx, 1999). Of the remaining 
83% who attempted to escape, 46% had to retum to their apartment or seek refuge in another 
apartment (Proulx, 1999). After the fire, 48% of the occupants stated that in a future fire they 
would act differently and many of them said they would stay in their apartments and 
disregard the voice communication instructions (Proulx, 1999). 
With proper compartmentation and fire safety measures, occupants who remain in their 
apartments are probably not at high risk. However, if the fire spreads or is not controlled then 
they may be at risk and have no means of escape. 
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12.2 Non-Evacuation 
The concept of non-evacuation in an emergency is not new, and to some extent it is already 
practised in some buildings. Hospitals, for example, may evacuate parts of the building, but 
unless patients are in immediate danger they will probably remain in their rooms. A non-
evacuation strategy is sometimes called defend in place, or protect in place. 
In 1985, MacDonald (1985) presented a paper with the conclusion that, in a fire resistive 
compartmented building, occupants are safer if they stay in their units, and the majority of 
people die trying to evacuate. MacDonald (1985) based his conclusions on 14 high-rise 
building fires (apartments and hotels) and found that, out of 160 fatalities, 117 died 
attempting to evacuate and 36 died by not evacuating (the location and decision of the 
remaining victims was indeterminate). 
Another advocate of non-evacuation in high-rise buildings is Proulx (2000), who at the May 
2000 NFP A conference stated "In high-rise buildings, unless the fire is in your compartment, 
all occupants should stay where they are, doing protect-in-place activities, waiting for 
instructions". Proulx (1999) also stated that at some stage of fire development, it is probably 
safer to instruct occupants to stay in their apartments unless they are in immediate danger. 
The emergence of non-evacuation strategy has developed from deaths and injury occurring 
due to occupants evacuating through untenable or poor conditions. If occupants remain in 
their rooms they may avoid evacuating though smoke filled corridors and stair shafts. In 
addition to this, the behaviour of occupants to fire alarms indicates a non-evacuation strategy 
maybe appropriate. Occupants do not respond well to fire alarms (Proulx, 2000), and they 
have been shown to wait for further information rather than evacuating immediately (Proulx 
and Fahy, 1997). 
If the building is fully sprinkler protected, the required fire rating between the compartments 
can be reduced. Sprinklers have an exemplary record in apartment buildings, and they 
provide one of the highest possible levels of protection. A sprinkler protected building and 
non-evacuation strategy could be extremely effective (MacDonald, 1985). 
The concept of non-evacuation in apartment buildings is based on each apartment being a 
separate fire compartment. This restricts the fire spread from the unit of origin into other 
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compartments in the building, and provides a safe place for occupants in their own units, to 
wait for assistance. 
In a non-evacuation strategy, the occupants not in the room of fire origin remain in place, 
being protected by passive protection and/or active systems. Occupants are in a secure and 
familiar place and can take measures to increase their safety. For example, occupants can: 
• Open windows for fresh air or move to balconies 
• Prevent smoke ingress with masking tape and wet towels 
• Communicate with the fire brigade (if telecommunications are unaffected) 
The advantages of non-evacuation in compartmented fire resistive buildings presented by 
MacDonald (1985) are: 
• The probability of survival is greater. It is not possible to guarantee that everyone 
will survive, but MacDonald ( 19 8 5) concluded that the chance of survival is 
greater if evacuation is not attempted. 
• Uniform handling of all occupants. Handicapped and non-ambulatory occupants 
have the same consistent emergency strategy. 
• Rooms offer more features for defence. 
Doors provide some smoke protection 
Towels, bedding etc can be used to seal penetrations. 
Windows can be opened 
The telephone can be used for communication 
• If you enter the corridor you could encounter the following problems 
Fire and combustibles in the corridor could cause a flashover 
There may be smoke in the corridor and stairs 
It is possible to be locked out 
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Occupants can be locked in stair shafts 
Egress distances can be long 
• Closed doors may restrict the flow of smoke. Because smoke travels with the 
flow of air, not opening doors reduces the airflow and therefore the smoke spread 
can be inhibited. 
• Stair pressurisation could fail with the opening of doors and fire fighters using 
the stairs as staging areas. 
• Uniform reaction of occupants irrespective of pre-movement and alarm time. 
• Eliminates decisions based on inaccurate information. Occupant decision making 
often depends on what other occupants see, think or do, which may not be 
accurate, resulting in poor decisions. 
• Evacuation of high-rise buildings is not always practical and the time it takes to 
evacuate high-rise buildings can be significant. In a high-rise building, not all 
occupants have the same level of risk, therefore the evacuation needs to be 
prioritised. If there is no co-ordination of the evacuation and everyone evacuates 
on alarm, then queuing and flow problems may occur. 
• The fire brigade's role will change. The fire brigade can focus on fighting the 
fire. There is less of a need to assist evacuating occupants, unless they are in 
immediate danger. The stairs would be clear for the fire brigade to use. The 
response time of the fire brigade may not be as crucial, due to occupants not 
evacuating through smoke. The fire service response has to also ensure the fire 
does not spread to other compartments. 
• There are no problems evacuating people using limited staff or wardens. 
Generally this will apply to hotels and care facilities where the number of night 
shift staff can be limited, and the staff is an integral part of the evacuation 
scheme. 
• Occupants or wardens are not put at risk trying to ensure everyone has evacuated, 
or assisting occupants evacuating. 
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• In some cases it may be simpler to use a non-evacuation strategy in existing 
buildings, rather than upgrading the active systems. 
Non-evacuation is not necessarily the answer to the fire safety problem of predicting human 
behaviour. A non-evacuation strategy eliminates some of the variables in human behaviour, 
but it can still result in serious problems. Some of the problems with non-evacuation are: 
• If fire is unable to be controlled a greater number of occupants are at risk 
• Compartmentation and the maintenance of passive fire protection is crucial to 
life safety (fire resistance ratings, smoke seals, fire doors and self-closers) 
• Occupants need to be familiar with the strategy, and be trained and educated. 
Changing occupant's mindset could be a problem. 
• External vertical fire spread needs to be prevented 
• There is increased responsibility on the fire brigade to control and extinguish the 
fire 
The conditions and building characteristics that Proulx (2000) believes necessary for a non-
evacuation strategy are: 
• High-rise building (over 6-storey) 
• Non-combustible construction 
• Central alarm system 
• Voice communication system 
In addition to these essential conditions, HV AC, pressurisation, sprinklers, balconies, doors 
with self-closers can also be provided (Proulx, 2000). 
12.2.1 Case study 
There is cunently insufficient data available to determine if non-evacuation is more effective 
than an evacuation strategy. MacDonald (1985) demonstrated that a higher number of 
fatalities occmTed in an evacuation strategy, but this was based on a small number of high 
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fatality cases. The cases that were selected by MacDonald (1985) would tend to favour a 
non-evacuation emergency strategy. This is because high fatality fires usually have 
evacuation casualties. 
Casualties can occur in the unit of fire origin, escape paths and in other apartments. The unit 
of fire origin usually has a low number of occupants relative to the total occupancy of the 
building. Therefore, in a high fatality fire many of the victims would not be from the unit of 
origin. In addition to this, in a compartmented building, a fire would usually produce 
untenable conditions in the room of origin and the exit paths (depending on whether the 
doors are left open). Therefore if fatalities occur, they will occur in these areas. As the room 
of origin usually has a small number of occupants, a high fatality fire would thus result in 
many of the victims being in the escape paths. 
High fatality fires are usually the result of multiple system and/or process failures, and 
usually can not be attributed solely to the evacuation strategy. It is easy in hindsight to say 
that if the occupants had stayed in their rooms they would have survived, but the conditions 
inside the rooms are not known, and the failure of other systems may have put them at risk. 
If information is available on the location of casualties, it can be inferred what evacuation 
decision was made. However this would not differentiate between occupants who evacuated 
from a safe place or occupants who evacuated because were forced to by fire or smoke. 
These are two fundamentally different concepts (Brennan, 1999). 
MacDonald's (1985) analysis also does not necessarily represent all building types and 
modem fire safety measures. New technology, changes to building codes, improved fire 
fighting techniques, fire safety research and regular maintenance have improved fire safety, 
and therefore reduced the risk of high fatality fires in new apartment buildings. 
To determine if non-evacuation is more effective than evacuation, the number of occupants 
that survive using an evacuation strategy needs to be analysed, to determine if the probability 
of survival is increased by not evacuating. Information on the number of injuries due to 
evacuation could also support the case for non-evacuation, but again the data is limited. 
In Appendix A, there are some summaries of fatal residential fires cases. These fires have 
been reported in journals and usually have multiple fatalities. Therefore there is high 
probability that some deaths would have occurred in the escape paths. 
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12.2.2 Case summary discussion 
The fire case summaries in Appendix A, is by no means a comprehensive analysis of 
apmiment fires. However the following trends and conclusion can be inferred from the cases: 
• Occupants on the level of fire origin or above the level of fire origin are most at 
risk. There are very few fatalities below the level of fire origin. 
• Catastrophic fires are generally the result of system failure(s) or arson. The 
failure of compartmentation and smoke detectors are a primary contributor to the 
fatalities. 
• Fatalities are caused by poor decision making. Occupants have attempted to 
remove burning sofas, thereby blocking escape paths and contributing to the fire 
and smoke spread. 
• Arson is a primary contributor to fatalities, especially where fires have been lit in 
stairways. In 1997 arson was the major cause of catastrophic fires (Tremblay and 
Fahy, 1998). 
• Doors play a significant role in controlling fire and smoke spread. In many cases, 
if self-closers had not been de-activated, or if occupants had not opened their 
door, they may have survived. 
• The ignition source of many of the catastrophic fires is cigarettes. The other 
major causes of fires are heaters and electrical faults. 
• The occupants at highest risk are children. A large proportion of the victims in 
catastrophic apartment fires are children. Another high-risk group is occupants 
who are intoxicated. 
• Occupants in board and care facilities are also a high-risk group. These 
occupants are usually mentally or physically disabled which affects their 
judgement and evacuation time. 
• Fire in corridors and stairs are extremely dangerous. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
page 74 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
12.3 Staged Evacuation 
A staged evacuation emergency strategy involves prioritising the evacuation of the building, 
with respect to the occupants who are most at risk. Staged evacuation is an "in-between" 
strategy, combining elements of full evacuation and non-evacuation. In general high-rise 
buildings would benefit most from a staged evacuation strategy, because occupants remote 
from the fire may not be at risk and may not even have to evacuate. 
General concepts for staged evacuation: 
• Compartmentation between floors needs to be maintained and two compartments 
on each floor is recommended (Sherry, 1983). The simplest way to achieve this 
is with a fire separation of the coni.dor into two of more compartments. 
• An emergency warning and information system (EWIS) should be provided. This 
provides a means of directing the evacuation, communicating with the occupants 
and reassuring the occupants. 
• On alarm, the EWIS system will evacuate the fire floor and floors above (using a 
pre-recorded message). On arrival, the fire brigade can co-ordinate the remainder 
of the evacuation. 
• Manual call points should not be connected to the EWIS. If a call point is 
activated that is not on the fire floor, the evacuation priority of the floors could 
be erroneous. 
• The detection system in the apartments and corridors should be used to activate 
the EWIS. An analogue addressable system can be used to identify the fire 
location. 
• Provisions will need to be made to minimise false alarms. Cross zoning the 
detection system, and sensitivity setting of the detectors, can be used to minimise 
the chance of false alarms. 
A staged evacuation strategy maybe more expensive due to a more costly alarm and 
detection system. As the complexity of the emergency strategy increases, so does the level of 
technology required to control the evacuation and inform the occupants. 
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Some of the problems with a staged evacuation or zone evacuation system are: 
• Compartmentation of floors is required (Shen-y, 1983). Occupants waiting to 
evacuate need to be protected either in their apartments or in lobbies. 
• A voice alarm system and pre-recorded messages are required (Shen-y, 1983). 
Problems can occur if an unforeseen scenario arises or the fire spreads. An 
automated system will only be able to cope with a limited number of situations 
and unique fire circumstances could defeat the system. 
• The alarm system must be thoroughly tested (Sherry, 1983), to ensure it operates 
con-ectly for all credible fire scenarios. 
• The evacuation scheme must be understood by all occupants (Shen-y, 1983). 
Education and training of occupants will ensure they know how to react and 
follow the instructions. Infmmation about system limitations and fire safety is 
also important to ensure occupants know how to react if the system fails. 
• Complexity (Shen-y, 1983). The simpler the system the less chance of system 
failure and confusion for occupants. 
• The alarm needs to be audible to all occupants. It is important that voice 
instructions are clear and able to be understood by occupants. This may require 
speakers in each apartment. 
The buildings in which staged evacuation systems may be appropriate depend on the 
building characteristics and the fire safety measures. Shen-y (1983) recommends buildings 
greater than 14 storeys, and/or occupied by more than 1000 people, would benefit from a 
staged evacuation scheme. 
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13 FIRE SAFETY MATRIX 
The objective of this fire safety matrix is to provide a guide for the fire engineering design of 
apartment buildings. The matrix is only intended for guidance and an appropriately qualified 
fire safety engineer should verify the final design. 
The three main fire scenarios that should be considered in the design of apartment buildings 
are: a smouldering fire in an apartment, a flaming fire in an apartment and a fire in common 
spaces (ie stairs and corridors). 
Irrespective of the building and occupant characteristics, some minimal fire safety measures 
should be implemented in all apartments. The following is a list of essential fire safety 
measures that should be provided in all apartment buildings: 
• Smoke detectors 
• Heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HV A C) system to shut down on fire 
alarm 
• A 30-minute minimum fire resistance between apartments, vertical shafts and 
floors. 
13.1 Emergency strategy 
Brief descriptions of the emergency strategy, or emergency plans used in the matrix are 
provided below. 
• Evacuation- on alarm all occupants evacuate the building. 
• Non evacuation- occupants in the room of fire origin evacuate the building. 
Other occupants remain in their rooms, waiting for fire brigade assistance and 
advice, and carry out protect-in-place activities. 
• Staged evacuation - occupants in the room of fire origin and on the fire floor 
evacuate first. The remaining occupants are directed to evacuate automatically in 
the following sequence until the fire brigade intervenes. Occupants immediately 
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above the fire floor evacuate after those on the fire floor, followed by the floors 
above. Occupants on levels below the fire floor are evacuated last. 
Fire brigade intervention can alter the sequence of evacuation, or halt the 
evacuation in response to current conditions or any changes. 
13.2 Occupants at risk 
For the three fire scenarios and the three emergency strategies, the following matrix outlines 
the occupants that are most at risk. 
Smouldering fire Apartment fire Public area fire 
• Apartment of fire origin • Apartment of fire origin • Floor of fire origin 
Evacuation • Floor of fire origin • Evacuating 
• Evacuating occupants occupants above 
above fire floor fire floor 
Non-Evacuation • Apartment of fire origin • Apartment of fire origin • Floor of fire origin 
• Apartment of fire origin • Apartment of fire origin • Floor of fire origin 
• Floor of fire origin • Evacuating 
• Evacuating occupants occupants above 
above fire floor fire floor 
Staged Evacuation 
13.3 Matrix variables 
The fire safety design of apartment buildings consists of numerous variables and 
interdependencies. These variables have to be considered concurrently to provide the most 
effective design. 
The selection of fire safety measures in many cases results in a trade-off between various 
alternatives. For example, sprinkler protection can permit a reduction in fire resistance rating 
required for buildings and may allow extended travel distances. These trade-offs and 
interrelationships between fire safety measures need to be considered to obtain the most 
efficient and effective fire safety design. 
Table 14 lists some of the fire safety measures that should be considered for apartment 
buildings. The variables presented are not a comprehensive list, and other fire safety 
measures may be more appropriate for more complex designs. 
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Table 14- Matrix variables 
Variables Sub-variables 
Building and egress • Building characteristics 
characteristics 
Building height 
Multiple occupancies or purpose 
groups 
Floor area 
No. of apartments 
Security bars 
• Egress characteristics 
Number of stairs 
Emergency lifts 
Protected paths 
Travel distances 
Exit widths 
Emergency lighting and signs 
• Passive protection 
Fire resistance ratings 
Self-closers on doors 
Smoke seals on doors 
Smoke doors in cotTidors 
Smoke and fire dampers 
Fire rated escape paths 
Low passive protection 
High passive protection 
• Refuge areas 
Refuge floors 
Refuge areas 
Fire Safety Systems • Detection 
Smoke detectors 
Heat Detectors 
Analogue addressable system 
Central/local detectors 
Manual call points 
• Alarm 
Sounders 
Emergency warning and 
intercommunication system (EWIS) 
Connection to fire brigade 
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Comments 
Usually governed by architectural 
and project constraints. 
The options assume each floor of the 
building is a separate fire 
compartment and the vertical shafts 
are separate fire compartments. 
All doors opening into escape paths 
should have self-closers. 
Low and high protection is to 
distinguish between occupants who 
are escaping and those who remain in 
their unit. Occupants outside their 
room will be partially protected or 
have a lower level of protection. 
Refuge areas should be provided for 
the disabled or they should be 
instructed to remain in their 
apartment. This needs to be 
incorporated into the building's 
emergency plan. 
Smoke detectors should be provided 
in all apartments. Hard-wired 
detectors are preferred. 
The alarm system will be more 
effective iflocated in apartments. 
Sound levels achieving a minimum of 
75 dB at bed head with doors closed. 
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Emergency plan 
Inspection and 
Maintenance 
Training and 
Education 
Occupant 
characteristics 
Fire brigade 
intervention 
Fire indicator panels 
Mimic panels 
• Suppression 
Sprinkler protection 
Fire extinguishers 
Fire hose reels 
Fire hydrants 
• Smoke Control 
Extraction 
HV AC shut down 
Compartmentation 
Pressurisation 
Zoned smoke control 
Evacuation \ 
Non-evacuation 
Staged evacuation 
Frequency of testing and checking of 
active and passive systems 
Maintenance of escape paths and 
keeping them of combustibles 
Frequency of fire drills 
Fire safety briefings 
Pamphlets and literature 
Simulate realistic conditions ie use 
theatrical smoke and reduced lighting 
Age 
Mental and physical ability/mobility 
Education 
Cultural background 
Alarm time (connection to the fire 
brigade) 
Time to reach apartment 
Time to set up and access floor 
Time to fight fire/search and rescue 
Communication with occupants 
Water availability 
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Sprinklers provide the highest level 
of property and life safety protection 
Fire extinguishers and fire hose reels 
should be provided to Building Code 
requirements. 
Smoke control compartmentation 
includes smoke lobbies and corridor 
smoke barriers. 
Pressurisation systems should not 
activate on detection of a fire in the 
area to be pressurised area. This is to 
prevent smoke spread. 
Regular maintenance to relevant 
Standards and Building Codes 
Fire safety training and emergency 
plan training 
Building wardens 
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Fire Internal fire spread Internal fire spread includes linings 
External fire spread and combustible materials. 
Fire growth rate External fire spread includes 
spandrels, balconies and separation 
Fire development stages distances. 
Fire size 
Flashover 
Enclosure effects 
13.4 Buildings greater than 25m 
The fire safety matrix for buildings greater than 25m high is presented in Table 15. The 
matrix provides the recommended fire safety measures for apartment buildings with respect 
to sprinkler protection and the emergency strategy. The matrix provides a simple method of 
determining some of the minimum fire safety requirements of an apmiment building. It can 
also be used to evaluate which type of emergency strategy would be most effective, or when 
sprinklers would be beneficial given certain building conditions. The justification of the 
recommended fire safety measures is provided in Section 14.1. 
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Table 15- Fire safety matrix: buildings greater than 25m 
Sprinkler Protected Non-sprinkler protected 
• FRR30 • FRR60 
• Refuge areas • Connection to fire brigade 
• Pressurised stairs • Emergency lifts 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on • Stair and lift lobbies 
apartment and escape path doors 
• Refuge areas (pressurised) 
Evacuation • Connection to the fire brigade • Self-closers and smoke seals on 
apartment and escape path doors 
• EWIS 
• Zoned smoke control with stair and 
corridor pressurisation 
• Additional egress routes 
(pressurised) 
• FRR60 • FRR90 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on • Connection to fire brigade 
apattment and escape path doors 
• Emergency lifts 
• Connection to fire brigade 
• Lift and stair lobbies Non-evacuation 
• EWIS 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on 
apartment and escape path doors 
• Stair pressurisation 
• FRR 60 • FRR90 
• Cross zoned detection • Cross zoned detection 
• Connection to fire brigade • Connection to fire brigade 
• Refuge areas • Refuge areas (pressurised) 
• Pressurised stairs • Emergency lifts 
Staged evacuation 
• EWIS • Lift and stair lobbies 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on • EWIS 
apatiment and escape path doors 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on 
apartment and escape path doors 
• Zoned smoke control with stair and 
corridor pressurisation 
The fire safety measures listed in the above matrix are designed to provide at least two levels 
of protection for the occupants. As the building height increases, the number of fire 
protection measures also increases to provide additional levels of protection and maintain the 
level of safety for the occupants. 
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Table 16 summarises the occupants who are most at risk and the levels of fire safety 
provided by the above fire safety matrix. Table 17 provides the cell key for identifying the 
designated cells in Table 16. This key remains the same for all cases presented. 
Table 16- Levels of fire safety (buildings greater than 25m) 
Cell Occupants most at risk Levels of fire safety 
1 • In apartment of fire origin Sprinklers, low passive protection, pressurised stairs, 
• On floor of fire origin 
fire brigade 
2 • In apartment of fire origin High passive protection, short travel distances to 
• On floor of fire origin 
protected exit paths, zoned smoke control, fire 
brigade 
. All occupants escaping 
3 • In apartment of fire origin Sprinklers, passive protection, fire brigade 
4 • In apartment of fire origin High passive protection, fire brigade. 
• On floor of fire origin 
. In apartment of fire origin Sprinklers, high or low passive protection (depends 5 
. On floor of fire origin on occupant location), pressurised stairs, fire brigade 
6 • 
In apartment of fire origin High or low passive protection (depends on occupant 
• On floor of fire origin 
. Occupants evacuating 
Table 17 - Cell key 
Sprinkler 
Protected 
location), zoned smoke control, fire brigade. 
Non-sprinkler 
protected 
Evacuation I 2 
Non-evacuation 3 4 
Staged evacuation :====5============6====== 
13.5 Buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m 
The fire safety matrix for buildings greater than three stories and less than 25m high is 
presented in Table 18. The justification of the recommended fire safety measures is provided 
in Section 14.2. 
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Table 18- Fire safety matrix: buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m 
Sprinkler Protected Non-sprinkler protected 
• FRR30 • FRR60 
• Refuge areas in stair shaft • Refuge areas for disabled in stairs 
Evacuation 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on • Stair smoke lobbies 
escape path doors 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on 
apatiment and escape path doors 
• FRR60 • FRR90 
Non-evacuation • Connection to fire brigade • Connection to fire brigade 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on • Self-closers and smoke seals on 
apartment and escape path doors apartment and escape path doors 
• FRR60 • FRR90 
• Connection to fire brigade • Connection to fire brigade 
• Refuge areas in stair shaft • Refuge areas in stair shaft 
Staged evacuation • EWIS • Stair smoke lobbies 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on • EWIS 
apartment and escape path doors 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on 
apartment and escape path doors 
Table 19- Levels of fire safety (buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m) 
Cell Occupants at risk Levels of fire safety 
1 • In apartment of fire origin Sprinklers, low passive protection, fire brigade 
• On floor of fire origin 
2 • In apartment of fire origin Low passive protection, smoke lobbies, fire brigade 
• On floor of fire origin 
• All occupants escaping 
3 • In apartment of fire origin Sprinklers, high passive protection, fire brigade 
4 . In apartment of fire origin High passive protection, fire brigade. 
. On floor of fire origin 
5 • In apartment of fire origin Sprinklers, high or low passive protection (depends 
• On floor of fire origin 
on occupant location), fire brigade 
6 . In apartment of fire origin High or low passive protection (depends on occupant 
• On floor of fire origin 
. Occupants escaping 
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13.6 Buildings less than three storeys 
The fire safety matrix for buildings less than three stories is presented in Table 20. The 
justification of the recommended fire safety measures is provided in Section 14.3. 
Table 20- Fire safety matrix: buildings less than three storeys 
Sprinkler Protected Non-sprinkler protected 
• FRR30 • FRR60 
Evacuation 
• Disabled occupants above ground • Self-closers and smoke seals on 
floor remain in apartment apartment and escape path doors 
• FRR60 • FRR90 
Non-evacuation • Connection to fire brigade • Connection to fire brigade 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on • Self-closers and smoke seals on 
apatiment and escape path doors apatiment and escape path doors 
• FRR60 • FRR 90 
• Self-closers and smoke seals on • Self-closers and smoke seals on 
apartment and escape path doors apartment and escape path doors 
Staged evacuation • EWIS • EWIS 
• Connection to fire brigade 
• Connection to fire brigade 
• Disabled occupants above ground 
floor remain in apartment 
Table 21 -Levels of fire safety (buildings less than three storeys) 
Cell Occupants at risk 
1 • In apartment of fire origin 
• On floor of fire origin 
2 . In apartment of fire origin 
• On floor of fire origin 
• All occupants escaping 
3 • In apartment of fire origin 
4 • In apartment of fire origin 
• On floor of fire origin 
5 • In apartment of fire origin 
• On floor of fire origin 
6 • In apartment of fire origin 
• On floor of fire origin 
• Occupants escaping 
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Levels of fire safety 
Sprinklers, low passive protection, fire brigade 
Low passive protection, smoke lobbies, fire brigade 
Sprinklers, high passive protection, fire brigade 
High passive protection, fire brigade. 
Sprinklers, high or low passive protection (depends 
on occupant location), fire brigade 
High or low passive protection (depends on 
occupant location), fire brigade. 
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14 DISCUSSION OF FIRE SAFETY MATRIX 
The fire safety matrix considers the building height, sprinkler protection and the emergency 
strategy as the primary variables. This is due to the high influence that the interactions of 
these variables have on other fire safety measures. In addition to this, the fire engineer can 
specify the emergency strategy and sprinkler protection for the building that will provide 
flexibility to the matrix. Therefore once the extent of these three variables has been 
determined the remaining fire safety systems can be selected to suit the building. 
The objective of the fire safety recommendations is to address key issues that result from a 
given set of building characteristics, while providing multiple levels of protection for 
occupants in the event of a fire. This provides a backup or redundancy in the design in the 
event of one part of the system failing. For example, if the sprinkler system fails the 
occupants will be protected with passive protection and smoke control systems. 
The following sections discuss the three building height limits with respect to the fire safety 
measures that have been recommended. The staged evacuation strategy has not been 
discussed separately as it is a combination of the other two strategies and the same 
fundamental principles apply. 
14.1 Buildings greater than 25m in height. 
Once buildings exceed 25m in height, the ability of the fire brigade to rescue occupants 
externally becomes limited. Therefore, a higher level of fire safety needs to be provided to 
the stairs and escape paths. Emergency lifts are also considered an option to provide rapid 
access for the fire brigade and egress for disabled occupants. 
As buildings become taller the level of fire protection needs to increase. This is due to: 
• Further travel distances, resulting in a higher chance of exposure to fire and fire 
products, and longer exposure time. 
• The reduced ability of the fire brigade to rescue people externally 
• The increased time for the fire brigade to reach upper levels 
• More occupants, resulting in a higher risk of injury and deaths 
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• There is a greater variability in occupant abilities and human behaviour, due to 
the greater number of occupants 
• There are more sources of ignition and fire 
14.1.1 Evacuation in buildings greater than 25m 
An evacuation strategy relies on the protection of egress paths, as well as the protection of 
occupants in their apartments before evacuation. The protection of egress paths is critical to 
ensure occupants are not evacuating through untenable conditions. In buildings greater than 
25m high, egress distances can be considerable and therefore, the time occupants spend in 
escape paths can be significant. 
In a sprinkler protected building, protection is provided by: 
1. The sprinkler system. The sprinklers will activate and extinguish or control the 
fire, reducing the threat to occupants. 
2. Compartmentation and mechanical systems. Rooms, coiTidors and stair shafts are 
recommended to have a FRR of at least 30 minutes. This will contain the fire in 
the room of origin and protect occupants before and during egress. Self-closers 
provided on doors are to ensure the fire does not spread to the coiTidor. The stairs 
are to be pressurised to limit smoke spread, provide a partial safe egress paths 
and provide a smoke free area for the fire brigade. 
3. The final level of protection is the fire brigade. The fire brigade's role would be 
to assist any remaining occupants and extinguish the fire. A connection to the fire 
brigade will be provided to achieve a faster response. 
In a non-sprinkler protected building the systems of protection are 2 and 3, as listed above, 
however the following other fire safety measures will be introduced to increase the level of 
protection: 
1. An increased FRR to 60 minutes minimum. This is to provide additional time for 
occupant evacuation and fire brigade intervention. If occupants choose to stay in 
their apartments the increased FRR will provide a higher level of protection. 
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2. Connection to the fire brigade. To ensure a faster response by the brigade to a 
fire. 
3. Emergency lifts to aid egress and fire brigade access 
4. Zoned smoke control system. This is to ensure smoke spread through the 
building is minimised. This should include stair and corridor pressurisation to 
reduce the chance of smoke spread into the escape paths. 
5. Lift and stair lobbies to provide an additional barrier against smoke and an area 
where occupants can wait for lifts or further instructions. These areas can be used 
as refuge areas or other pressurised refuge areas should be provided. 
6. Emergency warning and intercommunication system. This will allow occupants 
to communicate with the fire brigade and infmm them if assistance is required. 
7. Additional protected stairs or reduced travel distances, as a trade-off for the 
limited ability of the fire brigade to externally rescue occupants. 
14.1.2 Non-evacuation in buildings greater than 25m 
A non-evacuation strategy relies on the protection of the occupants in their apartments. There 
is a greater reliance on the fire brigade to extinguish the fire and assist occupants, if 
evacuation is necessary, during and after the fire is extinguished. 
In a sprinkler protected building, protection is provided by: 
1. The sprinkler system. 
2. Compartmentation and mechanical systems. The rooms are recommended to 
have a FRR of at least 60 minutes and to protect the occupants. The fire 
resistance rating should be designed so complete bum out of the apartment will 
not result in further fire spread. Self-closers and smoke seals should be provided 
on all doors opening into corridors. This is to contain the fire in the apartment of 
origin and reduce smoke spread to other apartments. In theory, there will be at 
least two doors with smoke seals between the fire and occupants. 
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3. The final level of protection is the fire brigade. The building alarm should be 
connected to the fire brigade to reduce the response time. 
In a non-sprinkler protected building the systems of protection are 2 and 3, as listed above, 
however the following other fire safety measures will be introduced to increase the level of 
protection: 
1. Increase FRR to 90 minutes (minimum). This is to ensure complete burnout 
occurs before further fire spread. 
2. Emergency lifts to aid egress and fire brigade access 
3. Lift and stair lobbies to provide protection for the fire brigade, or areas of refuge 
if occupants choose to escape. 
4. Stair pressurisation to provide a smoke free path for the fire brigade 
5. Emergency warning and intercommunication system. This will allow occupants 
to communicate with the fire brigade and inform them of any assistance that is 
required. It will also provide a means for the fire brigade to instruct the 
occupants. 
14.2 Buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m 
Buildings that are greater than three storeys and less than 25m, have different fire safety 
issues than buildings greater than 25m. The most notable of these is the fire brigade is able to 
rescue occupants and fight the fire externally, provided adequate access is provided and a 
window exists. The travel distances are also reduced, decreasing the time for occupants to 
evacuate and the fire brigade to reach the fire. 
The transfer of information may also increase, as occupants are relatively closer together. 
This increases their ability to communicate with other occupants and to perceive visual and 
audible cues. 
14.2.1 Evacuation in buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m 
This emergency strategy relies on the protection of the egress paths as well as the protection 
of the occupants in their compartments before they evacuate. The protection ofthe egress 
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paths is critical to ensure occupants are not evacuating through untenable conditions. Egress 
travel distances are less and therefore, the duration of occupant exposure to smoke is 
reduced. 
In a sprinkler protected building, protection is provided by: 
1. The sprinkler system. 
2. Compartmentation and mechanical systems. The apartments, corridors and stair 
shafts are recommended to have a FRR of at least 30 minutes. This will protect 
occupants before and during egress. Self-closers and smoke seals should be 
provided on all escape path doors. 
3. The final level of protection is the fire brigade. 
In a non-sprinkler protected building the levels of protection are 2 and 3, however the 
following other fire safety measures will be introduced to increase the level of protection: 
1. Increase FRR to at least 60 minutes to allow the complete bum out of the 
apartment without fire spread into the corridors or adjacent rooms. 
2. Self-closers on doors to contain the fire and smoke spread. 
3. Refuge areas in stairs for disabled occupants. 
4. Stair lobbies to provide two smoke and fire barriers for occupants in the stair 
refuge areas. 
14.2.2 Non evacuation in buildings greater than three storeys and less than 25m 
A non-evacuation strategy relies on protection of occupants in their apartments. There is a 
greater reliance on the fire brigade to extinguish the fire and assist in the evacuation after the 
fire is extinguished. The fire brigade can rescue occupants externally via ladders and fight 
the fire externally. 
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In a sprinkler protected building the levels of protection are: 
1. The sprinkler system. 
2. Compartmentation and mechanical systems. The rooms will have a 
recommended FRR of at least 60 minutes to protect the occupants. The fire 
resistance rating should be designed so that the complete burn out of the 
apartment will not result in further fire spread. Self-closers and smoke seals 
should be provided on all doors. This is to contain the fire in the apartment of 
origin and reduce smoke spread into other apartments. 
3. The final level of protection is the fire brigade. The building alarm will be 
connected to the fire brigade to reduce the fire brigade response time. 
In a non-sprinkler protected building the levels of protection are 2 and 3, as listed above, 
however the following other fire safety measures will be introduced to increase the level of 
protection: 
1. The fire resistance rating will be increased to at least 90 minutes. This will 
ensure the complete burnout of the apartment can occur without further fire 
spread. 
14.3 Buildings less than three storeys 
Buildings less than three storeys are generally the maximum size of a building without lifts. 
The egress distances in these buildings would typically be within the building code's 
maximum allowable travel distances, and may not require fire rated stair shafts. 
The relatively short travel distances result in short movement times, and a fast response from 
the fire brigade on the arrival. If necessary, occupants could also use unconventional escape 
routes, for example garden ladders or climbing down balconies. The fire brigade can also 
rescue occupants externally via ladder and fight the fire externally. 
The lack of lifts in buildings of this size may limit the number of mobility impaired 
occupants that would be present. In general, mobility impaired occupants would be located 
on the ground floor, where they would be able to escape directly to safety. If disabled 
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occupants are present, it is recommended that they remain in their apartments and wait for 
rescue. Therefore, they would use a non-evacuation strategy. 
14.3.1 Evacuation in buildings less than three storeys 
This emergency strategy relies on occupants escaping quickly. Without fire rated stair shafts 
the occupants have to travel a relatively short unprotected distance to make final escape. 
Occupants also need to be protected in their apartments before they attempt to escape. 
In a sprinkler protected building the levels of protection are: 
1. The sprinkler system. 
2. Compartmentation and mechanical systems. The apmtments are recommended to 
have a FRR of at least 30 minutes to protect the occupants before and during 
their egress. There should also be a FRR of 30 minutes in the corridors and stairs, 
if egress distance is in excess of the building code's prescriptive requirements. 
3. The final level of protection is the fire brigade. 
In a non-sprinkler protected building the levels of protection are 2 and 3, as listed above, 
however the following other fire safety measures will be introduced to increase the level of 
protection: 
1. The FRR will be increased to at least 60 minutes. This will ensure the fire does 
not spread further than the apartment of origin. 
2. Self-closers and smoke seals will be provided on all doors. This is to contain the 
fire in the apartment of origin and reduce smoke spread into other apartments. 
3. A connection to the fire brigade will be provided to achieve a faster response. 
14.3.2 Non-evacuation in buildings less than three storeys 
A non-evacuation strategy relies on the protection of occupants in their apmtments. For 
buildings less than 3 storeys the fire brigade can rescue occupants externally via ladders and 
fight the fire externally. 
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In a sprinkler protected building the levels of protection are: 
1. The sprinkler system. 
2. Compartmentation and mechanical systems. The rooms are recommended to 
have a FRR of at least 60 minutes and to protect the occupants. The fire 
resistance rating will be designed so that the complete bum out of the apartment 
will not result in further fire spread. Self-closers and smoke seals will be 
provided on all doors. This is to contain the fire in the apartment of origin and 
reduce smoke spread into other apartments. 
3. The final level of protection is the fire brigade. The building will be connected to 
the fire brigade to reduce the time for fire brigade arrival. 
In a non-sprinkler protected building the levels of protection are 2 and 3, however the 
following other fire safety measures will be introduced to increase the level of protection: 
1. The fire resistance rating will be increased to a minimum of 90 minutes to ensure 
the fire does not spread further than the apartment of origin. 
14.4 Risk and Reliability 
The assessment of the absolute risk to life safety to apartment building occupants is an 
extremely difficult task. The numerous scenarios, variables, limited data and changes in the 
risk to life safety during a fire incident, makes an assessment of occupant risk very difficult. 
Each of the eight elements in Figure 1 will have an impact on the risk to life safety and this 
level of risk will change during a fire incident. For example occupants on level of fire origin 
will have a relatively high risk, but if they move below the level of fire origin their risk to 
life safety will decrease. 
An assessment of the relative risk to life safety is a more feasible option, but again the 
numerous variables and limited data makes this difficult. Previous research by Beck and 
Yung (1990) used a risk assessment model to assess the expected risk to life and fire cost 
expectations of apartment buildings relative to the building code. 
An assessment of the relative life safety is simpler, and in some cases intuitive. In many 
instances, a qualitative relative risk assessment can be made. For example, given the same 
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building, sprinkler protection would be safer than no sprinkler protection. However, a 
relative assessment of life safety becomes more complex if different fire safety systems are 
assessed against each other. For example, is a building with a FRR 60 safer than a building 
with a FRR 30 and pressurisation? 
The absolute risk to life safety in the matrix cells is expected to different and they have not 
been designed to provide an equivalent level of safety for all occupants. Intuitively, it can 
been seen that occupants in a three storey sprinkler protected building would have a 
relatively higher level of life safety than occupants in a thirty storey sprinkler protected 
building irrespective of the other fire safety measures. Both buildings can be designed to be 
safe, but they may not have an equivalent level of risk to life safety. 
The reliability of fire safety measures is another important aspect that needs to be considered 
in a quantitative risk assessment. Previous sections in this report, contain reliability values 
for some of the fire safety measures. This data has been included to provide an indication of 
the reliability of the fire safety measures and their failure modes. 
Reliability data for some systems is available, but this is pretty limited and there is no 
correlations between the risk to life safety and the reliability of a system. For example a stair 
pressurisation system may work as designed, but fatalities could still occur. Some other 
difficult problems are questions such as, does a 60 minute FRR provide a higher level of 
safety than a 30 minute FRR and is a 30 minute fire rated wall more reliable than a 60 
minute wall? 
Information on the reliability of a fire safety measure is not enough to determine the risk to 
life safety of the occupants. The reliability data needs to be assessed in conjunction with the 
ability of the fire safety measures to protect occupants to provide some sort of measure of 
effectiveness. 
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The effectiveness of sprinklers and smoke detectors has been estimated in a study by NIST. 
The study found that in home fires: 
• The introduction of smoke detectors will reduce death rates by 52%. If sprinkler 
protection was introduced after the smoke detectors, the death rate would be 
reduced by a further 30%, resulting a total reduction in the death rate of 82% 
(Hall, 1993). 
• If sprinklers were introduced first the death rate would be reduced by 69%. 
Adding smoke detectors would reduce the death rate by a further 13%, resulting 
a total reduction in the death rate of 82% (Hall, 1993). 
• Sprinklers do not operate properly 8% of the time and smoke detectors do not 
operate properly 15% of the time (Hall, 1993). 
• Detectors are non-operational32% of the time when a fire occurs (Hall, 1993). 
This information of this type would be very useful in a quantitative risk assessment, however 
for other fire safety measures it is not readily available. In addition to this, it is difficult to 
assess the contribution of an individual fire safety measure to the safety of occupants. The 
safety of occupants is usually provided through the combination and interaction of different 
fire safety measures. Therefore the assessment of the contribution to life safety from 
individual safety measures is difficult without the consideration of these interdependencies. 
Another problem is that some fire safety measures provide protection indirectly. For example 
sprinkler protection would provide direct protection, but smoke detectors will provide 
indirect protection. Direct protection can be defined as the fire safety measures that can 
directly affect the fire or products of combustion. 
The limited information and data available makes it difficult to assess the matrix 
quantitatively. A relative risk assessment of the matrix with respect to the building code 
would be the next logical stage, but the statistics on the effectiveness of the fire safety 
systems is limited. Reliability data is relatively easy to determine, but data on the ability of a 
fire safety measure or a combination of measures to increase life safety is difficult to 
determine. 
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Some of the problems with a quantitative risk assessment are: 
Limited data 
Assessment of matrix variables 
Fire safety systems. Assessment of reliability and effectiveness of fire 
safety systems. 
Fire. Assessment of fire growth, spread, production of toxic products. 
Building characteristics. Level of safety provided by architectural 
characteristics, number of stairs, egress path widths, travel distances. 
Occupant characteristics. Assessment of occupant characteristics, human 
behaviour, physical and mental abilities. 
Training and Education. Decision making ability of occupants. 
Maintenance and inspections. Assess the frequency and effectiveness of 
maintenance program. 
Fire brigade intervention. Assessment of response time of fire brigade and 
time to extinguish or control the fire. 
• Assessment of interdependencies and inteiTelationships between matrix 
variables. For example, the fire size is related to the ability of sprinklers to 
control the fire. 
• Changes to the risk to life safety during a fire. Occupant behaviour, occupant 
location, occupant characteristics, fire characteristics, fire safety measures and 
fire brigade intervention can all change as the situation evolves. Therefore the 
level of risk faced by occupants also changes. 
To avoid the inherent difficulties in quantitative risk assessment, the fire safety design matrix 
is based on providing multiple levels of protection for the occupants. Therefore, if one of the 
fire safety measures fails, there is at least one other mechanism to provide protection. In 
addition to this, fire safety training is essential to educate occupants on what to do in the 
event of a fire, and how to maximise their chances of survival. 
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15 CONCLUSIONS 
Performance based building codes provide an opportunity to increase the level of fire safety 
in apartment buildings. However, to realise this objective, and maximise the effectiveness of 
fire safety measures, an integrated fire safety design is required. Guidance on the integration 
of fire safety measures has been provided, in this project, through the fire safety design 
matrix and recommended minimum fire safety requirements. This provides a tool for 
engineers that can be used to ensure the fundamental design issues are considered, and 
improvements in the fire safety design of apartment buildings are achieved. 
The key conclusions of this research report are summarised below. 
• A fire safety design matrix has been developed to provide a design guide for 
apartment buildings. The matrix considers sprinkler protection, building height 
and the emergency scheme as the primary variables, and recommends minimum 
fire safety measures that address the fundamental design issues in apartment 
buildings. 
• In some circumstances non-evacuation may be an appropriate emergency 
strategy. For certain building characteristics and fire safety measures, the benefits 
of a non-evacuation strategy appear to outweigh the advantages of an evacuation 
strategy. 
• Lifts are an option for occupant egress. Careful consideration needs to given to 
the design and operation of fire lifts, as well as occupant training and education. 
• Fire brigade intervention should be considered in the fire safety design. The fire 
brigade has an essential role in assisting the evacuation and suppressing the fire. 
The fire brigade is also the final level of protection, for occupants, in the event of 
a multiple system failure. 
• There is limited statistical data on the effectiveness of fire safety measures and 
the interdependencies between measures. To perform a quantitative risk 
assessment more data is required on the impact to life safety of various fire safety 
measures. 
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Statistical fire data for Australia is limited. The collection and analysis of fire 
statistics is extremely important, to determine if cunent fire safety measures are 
effective, and areas where improvements can be made. The publishing of fire 
statistics should be continued to provide valuable information for designers and 
researchers. 
There should be higher level of detail provided in the collected fire data. To 
establish the viability of a non-evacuation strategy, information is required on the 
locations of victims and their assumed actions. Details of injuries in fires could 
also provide valuable information on the effectiveness of different emergency 
strategies. 
• The fire case summaries have shown that well-known problems are still causing 
fatalities. Doors being left open, the disabling of smoke detectors, ineffective 
alarm systems and incorrect disposal of smoking materials have resulted in 
numerous fire deaths. 
• The case summaries have also shown that education and training are extremely 
important aspects of fire safety. A number of fatalities could have been prevented 
if occupants acted appropriately. 
Training and education should be provided in the emergency strategy, use of first 
aid fire equipment and fire safety. 
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17 APPENDIX A - FIRE CASE SUMMARIES 
Table 22 - Fatal residential fire cases 
Case 
Dormitory Fire, Cornell University, 
1967. (Gaudet, 1967). 
3 storey building (including 
basement), 48 rooms. 
Fire started in basement. 
Hotel, New Orleans, 1971. (Watrous, 
1971). 
1 7 storey hotel 
Fire started in 12th floor room. 
Baptist Towers, 1972. (Willey, 1973) 
11 storey apartment building. 
Fire started in ih floor apartment. 
Cambridge Ohio, Holiday Inn, 1979. 
(Demers, 1980). 
2 storey, 107 guest rooms, 200 
guests. 
The fire started in the first floor 
corridor that connected the lobby and 
guest rooms. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
Fatalities/injuries. Significant factors 
9 fatalities, 60 injuries. 
Doors from basement were wedged open. No alarm system 
was present. Students had to alert others by knocking on 
doors. 7 victims were found attempting to escape. 2 victims 
returned to their rooms after leaving their door open and were 
overcome by smoke. 
6 fatalities. 
All victims were found on the 1ih floor. 5 victims were using 
the lift for egress and the lift opened on the 1ih floor exposing 
them to heat and smoke. One victim was a staff member 
investigating the fire. Staff investigating the fire forced open 
the room door and left it open. 
10 fatalities 
9 victims were found on the floor of origin, one victim was 
found on the lOth floor. 
Elderly housing building, with occupants having disabilities. 
Two victims died from bums, the others from CO. One victim 
was found in the lift. 
Fire burnt through apartment door and spread to corridor. One 
occupant stayed in their rooms and used towels to prevent 
smoke egress. 
10 fatalities, 82 injuries 
Combustible interior finishes, unprotected vertical openings 
and inadequate notification of occupants contributed to the 
fatalities. 
5 fatalities were found in the 2nd floor corridor, 2 were found 
in 2nd floor rooms with their doors open, two were found in 
the stairs and one died in hospital. 
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MGM Grand Hotel Las Vegas, 1980. 
(NFPA, 1982). 
21 storey hotel, 3,400 guests. 
Fire began on ground floor and 
extensive smoke spread occUlTed 
throughout the hotel. 
Inn on The Park Hotel Fire, 1981, 
(NFPA, 1981). 
23 storey hotel. 
Fire started in electrical room on the 
211d floor. 
Las Vegas Hilton, 1981 (NFP A, 
1982). 
30 storey hotel, 2783 rooms. 
The fire began on the 8th floor and 
spread externally to the 28th floor. 
Orrington Hotel, 1981. (Juillerat, 
1981 ). 
8 storey hotel, 60 guests. 
Fire started in third floor lift lobby. 
Dorothy Mae Apartment Hotel, 1982. 
(Bell, 1983a). 
4 storey, 43 unit apartment. 
Fire started on 2nd floor. 
Rockefeller Park Towers, 1982. 
(Bell, 1983b) 
6 storey apartment, 133 units, 180 
residents. 
Fire started on 3'd floor. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
85 fatalities, 600 injuries. 
61 victims were found in the tower, 18 were found on the 
casino level (ground floor), 3 were found on the roof and 3 
died in hospital. 
Ofthe documented victims in the tower (61), 25 were found in 
rooms, 22 were found in corridors, 9 in stairways, 5 in lifts. 
6 fatalities, 67 injuries. 
All of the victims were found in one of hotel's 2 exit ways. 
Hotel telephone operator gave out conflicting information, 
asking some occupants to evacuate and others to remain in 
their rooms. Smoke spread through unprotected vertical 
openings. 20 occupants attempting to evacuate to the roof had 
to force a locked door. 
8 fatalities, 350 injuries. 
3 fatalities in the central tower lobby. 1 occupant fell/jumped. 
4 fatalities in guestrooms, evidence that their doors had been 
opened. No fatalities where occupants kept their door closed. 
No fatalities 
The training and actions of staff contributed to the lack of 
fatalities. Upgrades to fire safety also increased building 
safety. 
24 fatalities, 32 injuries 
Arson fire started in 2nd floor exit corridor. 19 of the fatalities 
were located on the 2nd and 3'd floor stairway landings. Doors 
to stairways were open during the fire. 
5 fatalities, 17 injuries 
Apartment consisted mainly of elderly occupants that had 
various disabilities. There were delays in fire brigade 
notification. Failure to close doors allowed smoke into the 
corridors. All victims were occupants of the 3'd floor and were 
found near the room of origin. Many occupants waited in their 
apartments for rescue. 
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Ramada Inn, 1983. (Cote et al, 1984) 
2 storey hotel, 80 rooms, 90 guests. 
Fire started in first floor corridor 
igniting rolls of carpet and padding. 
Howard Johnston's Hotel, 1984. 
(Timoney, 1984) 
14 storey hotel, 300 guests. 
Fire started in ih floor con·idor. 
Dupont Plaza Hotel, 1986. (Klem, 
1987). 
20 storey hotel. 
Fire started in 1 '1 floor ballroom. 
East 501h St Apartments, 1988. 
(DeVita and Dunn, 1988). 
10 storey apartment 
Fire started in ground floor lobby 
Phi Kappa Sigma Fraternity House 
Fire, 1990. (NFP A 2000b ). 
Multi-storey fraternity house. 
Fire statied in assembly room. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
5 fatalities, 33 injuries. 
Exit ways became untenable early, 2"ct floor occupants had to 
jump from windows. No Alarm system and detection system 
was inadequate. All fatalities were found in guest rooms and 
they were out of bed. Four were on the 2"ct floor one was on 
the 1 '1 floor. Rooms with doors closed sustained little fire 
damage. 
35 injuries. 
Rapid detection, prompt response by hotel staff, protection 
provided by guest room doors and prevention/education 
program and fire protection features prevent any loss oflife. 
3 guests found in the corridor sustained serious injuries. 
97 fatalities, 140 injuries 
85 victims were found in casino who were trapped when it 
flashed over. 5 of the remaining victims were found in the 
lobby, 3 were found in an lift, two were found near a pool side 
bar, one was found in a 41h floor room and one person died in 
hospital. 
4 fatalities. 
All victims were found outside their rooms attempting to 
escape. Lobby stair doors contributed to smoke spread and 
smoke logged stairs. Occupants who remained in their 
apartments were safe. Occupants had to be removed by 
portable ladders. 
3 fatalities, 2 injuries. 
Open stairs, combustible interior finishes, lack of 
compartmentation and lack of fire safety training contributed 
to the fatalities. 
page 111 
The Fire Safety Design of Apartment Buildings 
The Polo Club Condominium, 
Denver, Colorado, 1991. (Harvey, 
1992-1993). 
20 storey apartment, 150 apartments. 
Fire began on ih floor, from and 
electric blanket. 
Paxton Hotel, Chicago, 1993. 
(NFP A, 2000c) 
Ontario Apartment Fire, 1995. 
(Proulx, 1996). 
30 storey, 13 apartments on each 
floor. 
Fire started in 5th floor apartment. 
Dormitory Fire, Franklin, MA, 1995. 
(NFPA, 1995) 
3 storey dormitory, 28 occupants. 
Fire began on the 2nd floor. 
Phi Gamma Delta Fraternity, Chapel 
Hill, 1996. (Wolf, 2000). 
4 storey fraternity house, 20 
occupants. 
Fire started in the basement. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
1 civilian injury and 5 fire fighters were injured. 
All fire fighting equipment had to carried to ih floor, resulting 
in fatigue. The fire was confined to unit of origin and 
occupants who were not evacuated were told to remain in their 
apartments. 
20 fatalities, 28 injuries. 
Hotel occupants were mainly the elderly and low-income 
people. The fire spread to several rooms and corridors. 
Occupants were required to be rescued externally. 
6 fatalities, 11 injuries. 
the 6 fatalities were found between the 27th and 30th floor in 
the staircase. All occupants who stayed in their apartments 
were safe. Late evacuation contributed to fatalities. Occupants 
were prepared to move through smoke. 
No fatalities or loss of life. 
Building was a total loss. The closure of the door of fire origin 
allowed time for occupants to escape. Opening of door by 
security personnel contributed to the fire spread. 
The age and agility of residents, familiarity of the building's 
means of egress and quarterly fire drills contributed to the lack 
of fatalities. 
5 fatalities. 
4 victims were found in bedrooms, one victim was found 
partially in the hallway. Two victims were found in locked 
bedrooms. All victims were on the second floor. Wood 
panelling in the basement contributed to the fire spread. 
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Ontario Apartment Fire, 1997. 
(Proulx, 1999). 
25 storey, 295 condominiums. 
Fire started on 61h floor and burned 
through door and spread into the 
corridor. 
Bremerton, W A Apartment Building 
Fire, 1997. (NFPA, 1999). 
4 storey apartment, 142 units 
Fire occurred in an apartment on the 
3'd level. 
Ottawa high-rise apartment (Proulx, 
1999). 
25 storey apartment. 296 
condominiums. 
The fire began on the 61h floor and 
burned through the door. The fire 
brigade arrived and extinguished the 
fire within 10 minutes. 
NFP A Catastrophic Fires 
Florida, Residential Hotel, 1990 
(Fahy and Tremblay, 1991) 
3 storey, 101 rooms 
Fire began in the crawl space 
between the first and second floors. 
New York, Apartment, 1990 (Fahy 
and Tremblay, 1991) 
3 storey 
Fire deliberately lit in first floor stair 
well. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
2 fatalities, 4 injuries. 
The 2 fatalities suffered heart attacks. 
All respondents above the fire floor that attempted to evacuate 
encountered smoke. Tubular-core wood apartment doors 
contributed to fire and smoke spread. 
4 fatalities, 12 injuries. 
Manager investigated smoke detector and failed to close 
apartment door. Wood panelling in corridor contributed to fire 
spread. Fire spread externally via window. Combustible wall 
linings, open apatiment door inadequately protected means of 
escape and inadequate fire alarm system, contributed to the 
fatalities. 
2 fatalities. 4 people suffered inhalation, two people suffered 
heart attacks. 
Fire dept ordered occupants to evacuate. 83% attempted to 
evacuate 54% were successful. Remaining returned to 
apartment or sought refuge in another apartment. 
9 fatalities 
Fire spread through the loft area. Most of the victims were 
elderly. 
5 fatalities 
All victims found on third floor. Second floor occupants 
escaped via rear window. 
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New York, Apartment, 1990 (Fahy 
and Tremblay, 1991) 
4 storey, 23 units 
An occupant on first floor ignited 
curtains in the bedroom. 
Minnesota, Hotel, 1991 (Miller and 
Tremblay, 1992) 
3 storeys 
Fire began in first floor dining room. 
New York, Apartment, 1991 (Miller 
and Tremblay, 1992) 
3 storey, 3 units 
Occupant ignited mattress in hallway. 
Michigan, Apatiment, 1991 (Miller 
and Tremblay, 1992) 
5 storey, 46 units 
Incident unreported pending 
litigation. 
New Jersey, Apartment, 1991 (Miller 
and Tremblay, 1992) 
3 storey, 3 units 
Heater ignited combustibles in a first 
floor bedroom. 
Illinois, Apartment, 1991 (Miller and 
Tremblay, 1992) 
3 storey, 6 units 
Fire began in second floor apartments 
from an electrical fault. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
5 fatalities 
All victims were elderly 
7 fatalities 
Hotel was in a rural area without fire department coverage. It 
is undetermined if the occupants attempted to escape or 
awoke. 
6 fatalities 
Escaping occupants and fire fighters were hindered by 
furniture in the hallways. 
6 fatalities 
5 fatalities 
Escaping occupants aided fire spread by leaving doors open. 
Three children were trapped on the third floor by the 
advancing fire. 
5 fatalities 
Two were under the influence of alcohol. 
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California, Apartment, 1991 (Miller 
and Tremblay, 1992) 
2 storey, 6 units 
Flammable liquid was poured 
through the front door mail slot. 
Illinois, Apartment, 1992 (Tremblay, 
1993) 
3 storey, 36 units 
Fire started on the second floor and 
spread to the third floor trapping 
occupants. 
Illinois, Hotel, 1993 (Tremblay, 
1994) 
4 storey, 140 rooms 
Fire started on the first floor between 
two rooms. Fire spread via the un-
enclosed stairs and concealed spaces. 
California, Apartment, 1993 
(Tremblay, 1994) 
3 storey, 69 units 
Fire started on the second floor and 
spread to the third via open fire 
doors. 
Michigan, Apartment, 1993 
(Tremblay, 1994) 
2 storey, 5 units 
Fire started on the second floor 
corridor and spread via combustible 
finishes. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
5 fatalities 
15 sleeping occupants were trapped. 
5 fatalities 
Interior fire doors were propped open allowing the fire to 
spread. Occupants were forced to jump out of windows. 
20 fatalities 
Fire doors protecting the stairwells on the top three floors had 
been removed, security bars trapped occupants. More 
occupants required rescue than the fire department could 
handle. 
12 fatalities 
Fire doors protecting stairwells on the top three floors were 
blocked open. Occupants on the third floor were trapped. 
9 fatalities 
All victims died of smoke inhalation and were found in 
second floor apartments. Occupants on the first floor escaped. 
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Rhode Island, Apartment, 1993 
(Tremblay, 1994) 
3 storey, 3 unit 
Fire started in the stairwell on the 
first floor. 
California, Apartment, 1993 
(Tremblay, 1994) 
2 storey, 17 unit apartment 
Gas fuelled wall heater ignited timber 
stmcture on the first floor. 
Texas, Apartment, 1993 (Tremblay, 
1994) 
2 storey, 8 units 
Fire began in the living room on the 
first floor. Fire did not leave unit of 
origin. 
North Carolina, Apartment, 1993 
(Tremblay, 1994) 
2 storey, 8 units 
Fire began in the living room of a 
first floor apartment. Fire spread to 
the second floor externally. 
Ohio, Apartment, 1993 (Tremblay, 
1994) 
2 storey, 4 units 
Fire started on a chair in first floor 
living room. Occupant tried to 
remove chair and blocked the front 
door and stairs. Fire spread up stairs. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
6 fatalities 
The door to a third floor apartment had been left open 
allowing the fire to spread. All six victims were found in this 
apartment. 
6 fatalities 
Victims were found on the second floor and died of smoke 
inhalation. 
5 fatalities 
All fatalities were found in second floor bedrooms. 
5 fatalities 
Four victims on the second floor had their primary exit 
blocked by fire. One tenant in unit of origin died of smoke 
inhalation. 
5 fatalities 
Fire breached fire-wall dividing the building in half. 
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Illinois, Apa1iment, 1994 (Tremblay, 
1995) 
4 storey, 4 7 units 
Flammable liquid was spread in the 
stair on the third floor. Fire spread 
throughout the third and fourth floor. 
Louisiana, Apartment, 1994 
(Tremblay, 1995) 
2 storey 4 units 
Fire began in second floor apartment 
and spread to other second floor 
apartment. 
Pennsylvania, Fraternity house, 1994 
(Tremblay, 1995) 
2 storey 
Fire on couch in partially enclosed 
porch travelled up un-enclosed 
stairway. 
Minnesota, Apartment, 1995 
(Tremblay, 1996) 
2 storey, 4 units 
Cigarette ignited couch in first floor 
apartment. 
California, Apartment, 1995 
(Tremblay, 1996) 
2 storey, 4 units 
Bedroom carpeting on the first floor 
was ignited. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
9 fatalities 
Six victims were found at the rear of the fourth floor, 1 victim 
jumped from the fourth floor, remaining victims were rescued 
and died later. Numerous occupants were rescued by ladders 
and aerial towers. 
5 fatalities 
All victims were in bedrooms. One was rescued, but later 
died. 
5 fatalities 
All victims made some attempt to evacuate. All had alcohol in 
blood, three had marijuana and one had cocaine. 
7 fatalities 
All victims were in the apartment of origin. Victims died fi·om 
CO poisoning, they all had a carboxyhemoglobin> 55%. 
5 fatalities 
All victims were in the apartment of origin. 5 children were 
rescued but later died. Security bars on windows and entrance 
doors. 
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Rhode Island, Apartment, 1995 
(Tremblay, 1996) 
2 storey, 6 units 
Fire began in a second floor living 
room. 
Oregon, Apartment, 1996 (Tremblay, 
1997) 
3 storey, 24 units 
Fire deliberately lit in stair well 
blocking occupant egress. 
California, Apartment, 1996 
(Tremblay, 1997) 
3 storey, >20 units 
Fire started in bedroom and spread to 
the apartment's, hallway and dining 
room/kitchen. 
North Carolina, Fraternity house, 
1996 (Tremblay, 1997) 
3 storey 
Fire started in basement bar. 
Pennsylvania, Apartment, 1997 
(Tremblay and fahy, 1998) 
3 storey, 7 units 
Fire ignited a bed in first floor 
apartment. 
New Jersey, Apartment, 1997 
(Tremblay and Fahy, 1998) 
3 storey, 6 units 
Fire spread from first floor apa1iment 
bedroom through structural voids and 
open stairwell 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
5 fatalities 
All victims were in the apartment of origin. The fire spread to 
the sleeping areas and trapped all the victims. 
8 fatalities. 
Two people died in one apartment and 6 died in another. Both 
were on the 3'd floor and had doors open. Survivors escaped 
via windows or patio doors. 
7 fatalities 
All 7 were in the room of fire origin, 5 died from smoke 
inhalation, 2 died from thermal burns. 
5 fatalities 
4 people found on the 2nd floor had a blood alcohol level of 
>0.14. The 51h victim had no alcohol in her blood and was 
found in her bedroom door. 
6 fatalities 
Advancing fire blocked the only interior escape route. 
Occupants had to escape from windows. 
6 fatalities 
Six children in third floor apa1iment died of smoke inhalation. 
They were gathered around a window blocked by an air-
conditioner. 
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Kentucky Apartment, 1997 
(Tremblay and Fahy, 1998) 
2 storey, 3 units 
Fire began in second floor apartment 
kitchen. 
Illinois, Apartment, 1997 (Tremblay 
and Fahy, 1998) 
2 storey, 3 units 
Combustibles on a first floor porch 
were ignited and the fire spread 
vertically trapping second floor 
occupants. 
Illinois, Apartment, 1997 (Tremblay 
and Fahy, 1998) 
3 storey, 6 units 
Electrical fault started fire in first 
floor living room. 
California, Apartment, 1997 
(Tremblay and Fahy, 1998) 
3 storey, 8 units 
Fire started in third floor living room. 
Massachusetts, Apartment, 1997 
(Tremblay and Fahy, 1998) 
3 storey, 12 units 
Fire started in the basement and 
spread through the concealed spaces 
and structural voids. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
6 fatalities 
Two victims died attempting to escape fi·om a second storey 
window. One victim was in the bedroom of the apatiment of 
origin. The remaining victims were in a bedroom in the 
apartment across the hall. 
6 fatalities 
All victims were on the second floor, four victims were found 
near the interior stairway, one was in a bedroom and 
remaining victim was rescued and died later. 
6 fatalities 
Location of victims was not reported 
6 fatalities 
All victims in the apatiment of origin. 
6 fatalities 
All victims were attempting to escape. Five members of one 
family were separated as they attempted to evacuate and were 
overcome by smoke. 
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Colorado, Hotel, 1997 (Tremblay and 5 fatalities 
Fahy, 1998) The fire trapped 4 victims in their rooms. One victim was 
2 storey, 110 rooms caught in the flashover. All victims' rooms opened into the 
Fire started in a first floor storeroom. breezeway. 
Flames spread rapidly engulfing a 
breezeway. 
Oklahoma, Apartment, 1997 5 fatalities 
(Tremblay and Fahy, 1998) All victims were in the attic apartment. Their only other exit 
3 storey, 5 units was nailed shut. 
Occupant on second floor 
accidentally ignited sofa from 
cigarette. He tried to move the sofa 
outside, and stopped in front of an 
open door. The fire spread to the 
wooden exterior stairway that was the 
exit for the attic apartment. 
Virginia, Apartment, 1998 6 fatalities 
(Tremblay, 1999) Stairwell was compromised by fire. All victims were on the 
3 storey, 13 units 3'd floor. 
Fire started on second floor stairwell. 
Tennessee, Apartment, 1998 5 deaths 
(Tremblay, 1999) All victims were found on the second floor. The fire travelled 
2 storey through the concealed spaces and the second floor collapsed. 
Fire ignited combustibles in a first 
floor living/dining room area. 
The NFPA defines a Catastrophic Fire, as a fire with five or more fatalities in residential 
buildings (single family dwellings, apartments, hotels and motels) or three or more fatalities 
in a non-residential buildings. Non-residential buildings include health care facilities. 
Some of the problems encountered in health-care fires are applicable to apartment fires. 
Health care facilities consist of occupants with mixed abilities and characteristics similar to 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
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apartment buildings. For example, the limited abilities of patients and slower egress times 
can also be characteristics of apartment building occupants. NFPA catastrophic health-care 
facility fires, greater than one-storey, have been summarised below. 
Table 23- Health-care facilities greater than one storey (non-residential) 
Case 
Detroit, Board and Care Facility, 
1992. (NFPA, 2000). 
3 storey, 16 occupants. 
Fire started in 1st floor kitchen 
St. Genevieve, Quebec Board and 
Care Fire, Fire Investigations, 1996. 
(NFP A, 2000a) 
3 storey, 41 residents. 
Fire began in room on 2nd floor. 
Harvey Lakes P A, 1997. (NFP A, 
1997). 
2 storeys plus basement, 21 residents. 
Fire started in enclosed porch area. 
By cigarette. 
Board and Care, Arlington 
Washington, 1998. (NFPA, 1998). 
2 storey, 32 occupants and 2 staff. 
Fire started in first floor room. 
NFP A Catastrophic Fires 
Texas, Board and care facility, 1990 
(Miller and Tremblay, 1991) 
2 storey 
Resident on first floor ignited fabric 
in living room. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
Fatalities/injuries. Significant factors 
10 fatalities 
Elderly occupants were disabled. Lack of fire safety training, 
sprinkler protection, combustible finishes, second exit (on 2nd 
floor) and open stairways contributed to the fatalities. 
7 fatalities. 
Board and Care facility contained elderly residents. Fire 
spread externally to 3'd floor via window. Corridor and stair 
well doors were propped open. Combustible contents in the 
corridor, fire spread through concealed spaces, open doors, 
fire brigade notification delays and lack of sprinklers 
contributed to the fatalities. 
10 Fatalities 
Occupants were elderly with disabilities. Self-closing device 
was deactivated. Inadequate means of escape, ineffective 
actions by staff, open fire doors, lack of self-closers and 
inadequate fire rated doors contributed to the fatalities. 
8 fatalities. 
3 victims located in room of origin. Lack of smoke detectors, 
open door from room of origin, open fire doors, open room 
doors allowed the fire to spread and contributed to the 
fatalities. 
4 fatalities 
All victims were trapped on the second floor. 
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Michigan, Board and care facility, 
1992 (Tremblay, 1993) 
3 storey 
Smoking material was carelessly 
discarded in the kitchen. 
New York, Hospital, 1993 
(Tremblay, 1994) 
8 storey, 705 beds 
Fire started on the 7th floor in 
patient's room from medical 
equipment. Components containing 
oxygen were damaged resulting in an 
unlimited supply of oxygen at 50psi. 
Alabama, Board and care facility, 
1994 (Tremblay, 1995) 
2 storey 
Fire began in first floor storage utility 
room. 
Tennessee, Board and care facility, 
1996 (Tremblay, 1997) 
2 storey 
Improperly disposed of smoking 
material ignited fire in wastebasket in 
bedroom. 
Connecticut, Board and care facility, 
1996 (Tremblay, 1997) 
3 storey 
Third floor occupant fell asleep and 
cigarette ignited love seat. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
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10 fatalities 
Lack of second floor exit hindered escape. Open stairwell and 
unprotected openings allowed vertical fire spread. Victims 
were found in escaping positions. 
3 fatalities 
Two patients in room of origin died and a third victim in a 
near by room died of smoke inhalation. Their doors were left 
open. 
Staff closed most bedroom doors, automatic doors in conidors 
limited fire spread and smoke. Sprinklers were present in 
corridors and helped prevent fire spread. 
6 fatalities 
All victims were mentally handicapped, 5 victims were found 
in second floor bedrooms, the 6th attempted to escape by using 
a stair that had burned away. 
4 fatalities 
Door to room of origin left open. 1 victim in room of origin 
died from burns. Two residents in opposite room died from 
smoke due to bedroom door being blocked open. 1 victim was 
rescued and died in hospital 
3 fatalities 
One victim was rescued from his room, but died in hospital, 1 
victim was overcome by smoke in her bathroom. (Location of 
3'd victim is unknown). 
The rooms did not have self-closers, so when the occupant 
left, smoke made the conidor untenable. Several occupants 
stayed in their units until fire fighters rescued them. 
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Pennsylvania, Board and care facility, 
1997 (Tremblay and Fahy, 1998) 
2 storey, 21 residents 
Improperly discarded cigarette 
ignited exterior wood siding. The fire 
spread externally. Heat and smoke 
spread internally through the 
enclosed stair. 
Washington, Board and care facility, 
1998 (Tremblay, 1999) 
2 storey 
Resident on first floor ignited 
bedding. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
10 fatalities 
The duty staff member thought the fire was a false alarm and 
switched off the alarm. The fire rated door to the stair well 
was open and the self-closer was deactivated. Occupants were 
between the age of 58 to 99 and some had mental disabilities. 
8 fatalities 
The fire spread from room of origin through open door into 
the corridor. 
3 victims in room of origin died. 2 victims found in bathroom 
on 2nd floor adjacent stair well. 3 victims found in bedroom on 
2nd floor opposite stair well. 
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18 APPENDIX B- BCA EGRESS REQUIREMENTS 
Clauses for the number of exits, exit travel distances, distance between alternative exits and 
dimensions of exits and paths of travel, extracted from the BCA (ABCB, 1996). 
D1.2 Number of e.·'dts 
(a) All buildings- Every building must have at least one exit from each storey. 
(b) Class 2 to 8 buildings- In addition to any horizontal exit, not less than 2 exits must be provided from 
the following: 
(i) Each storey if the building has an effective height of more than 25m. 
(ii) A Class 2 or 3 building subject to Cl.5 
(c) Basements- In addition to any horizontal exit, not less than 2 exits must be provided from any storey if 
egress from that storey involves a vertical rise within the building of more than 1.5m, unless-
(i) the floor area of the storey is not more than 50m2; and 
(ii) the distance of travel from any point on the floor to a single exit is not more than 20m. 
(g) Access to exits- without passing through another sole-occupancy unit, eve1y occupant of a storey or 
part of a storey must have access to-
(i) An exit; or 
(ii) At least 2 exits, if 2 or more exits are required. 
D1.4 Exit travel distances 
(a) Class 2 and 3 buildings 
(i) The entrance doorway of any sole-occupancy unit must be not more than-
(A) 6mfrom an exit, orfi·om a point fi·om which travel in different directions to 2 exits is 
available; or 
(B) 20m from a single exit serving the storey, at the level of egress to a road or open 
space: and 
(iv) no point on the floor of a room which is not a sole-occupancy unit must be more than 20m fi·om 
an exit or from a point at which travel in different directions to 2 exits is available. 
Department of Civil Engineering 
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Dl. 5 Distance between altemative exits 
Exits that are required as alternative means of egress must be-
(a) distributed as uniformly as practicable within or around the storey served and in positions where 
unobstructed access to at least 2 exits is readily available fi·mn all points on the floor including the lift 
lobby areas; and 
(b) not less than 9m apart; and 
(c) not more than-
(i) in a Class 2 or 3 building- 45m apart 
(d) located so that alternative paths of travel do not converge such that they become less than 6m apart. 
D1.6 Dimensions of exits and paths of travel to exits 
In a required exit or path of travel to an exit-
(a) the unobstructed height throughout must be not less than 2m; except the unobstructed height of any 
doorway may be reduced to not less than 1980mm; and 
(b) the unobstructed width of each exit or path of travel to an exit, except for doorways, must be not less 
than-
(i) 1m; or 
(ii) 1.8m in a passageway. Corridor or ramp normally used for the transportation or patients in beds 
within a treatment area or ward area; and 
(c) if the storey or mezzanine accommodates more than 100 persons but not more than 200 persons (or 
part) in excess of 1 00; or except for doorways, must be not less than-
(z) 1m plus 250mm for each 25 persons (or part) in excess of 1 00; or 
(ii) 1.8m in a passageway, corridor or ramp normally used for the transportation of patients in beds 
within a treatment area or ward area; and 
(d) if the storey or mezzanine accommodates more than 200 persons, the aggregate unobstructed width, 
except for domways, must be increased to-
(i) 2m plus 500mm for eve!)' 60 persons (or part) in excess of 200 persons if egress involves a 
change in floor level by a stainvay or ramp with a gradient steeper than 1 in 12; or 
(ii) in any other case, 2m plus 500mmfor eve1y 75 persons (or part) in excess of 200; and 
Department of Civil Engineering 
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(e) in an open spectator stand which accommodates more than 2000 persons, the aggregate unobstructed 
width, except for doorways, must be increased to 17m plus a width (in metres) equal to the number in 
excess of2000 divided by 600; and 
(f) the unobstructed width of a doorway must be not less than-
(i) in patient care areas through which patients would normally be transported in beds, if the door 
opens into a corridor of width-
(A) greater than 1.8m and less than 2.2m- 1200mm; or 
(B) not less than 2.2m -1 070mm; or 
(iz) in patient care areas in horizontal exit-1250mm; or 
(iii) the unobstructed width of each exit provided to comply with (b), (c), (d) or (e) minus 250mm; or 
(iv) in any other case except where it opens to a sanitary compartment or bathroom- 750mm wide; 
and 
(g) the unobstructed width of a required exit must not diminish in the direction of travel to a road or open 
space, except where the width is increased in accordance with (b)(ii) or (f)(i). 
Department of Civil Engineering 
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19 APPENDIX C -EXTERNAL FIRE SPREAD BUILDING CODE 
REQUIREMENTS 
The Building Code of Australia (ABCB, 1996) prescriptive requirements for vertical 
separation of openings in external walls: 
C2. 6 Vertical separation of openings in extemal walls 
!fin a building (other than an open-deck cmpark or an open spectator stand) which is required to be of Type A 
construction and does not have a sprinkler system complying with Specification E1.5 and part of a window or 
other opening in an external wall, (except openings within the same stairwa;~-
(a) is above another opening in the storey next below; and 
(b) its vertical projection falls no fitrther than 450mm outside the lower opening (lneasure horizontally), 
the opening must be separated by-
(c) a spandrel which-
(i) is less than 900mm height; and 
(ii) extends not less than 600mm above the upper swface of the intervening floor; and 
(iii) is of non-combustible material having an FRL of not less than 60/60/60; or 
(d) part of a curtain wall or panel wall that complies >vith (c); or 
(e) construction that complies with (c) behind a curtain wall or panel and has any gaps packed with a 
non-combustible material that will withstand thermal expansion and structural movement of the wall 
without loss of seal against fire and smoke; or 
(f) a slab or other horizontal construction that-
(i) projects outwards fi'om the external face of the wall not less than 11 OOmm; and 
(ii) extends along the wall not less than 450mm beyond the openings concerned; and 
(iii) is non-combustible and has an FRL of not less than 60/60/60 
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The Acceptable Solutions to the NZBC (BIA, 1991), external fire spread prescriptive 
requirements: 
4.4.5 Extemalfire spread between different levels of the same building 
Except where firecells are sprinklered, one of the measures described in Paragraphs 4. 4. 6 to 4. 4. 7 shall be 
provided where either of the following conditions occur: 
a) Firecells containing pwpose groups SC, SD, SA, SR or IE are one or more levels above the final exit, 
or 
b) Firecells containing pwpose group CM are two or more levels above the final exit. 
4.4. 6 Where the conditions of Paragraph 4.4.5 occm; unprotected areas in the external walls of firecells 
shall be separated by no less than: 
a) 2.5m where any part of the unprotected areas are vertically aligned above one another, or 
b) 900mm where the unprotected areas on one level are horizontally offset fi·om those on other level. 
4.4. 7 Where the separation requirement of Paragraph 4.4.6 is not satisfied, au apron shall be provided 
between the lower unprotected areas and those in the upper firecell. The apron shall: 
a) project horizontally no less than 600mmfi·om the face of the building, 
b) continue no less than 600mm beyond the outer corners of the unprotected area, and 
c) have a FRR of no less than that ofthefloor between the upper and lowerfirecells 
Department of Civil Engineering 
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